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This thesis examines the usefulness of economic sanctions in the prevention of the 
proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).  Focusing on nuclear proliferation 
and utilizing the existing sanctions literature, this thesis examines three cases where 
sanctions played a role in U.S. policy. The cases are South Africa, Libya and Iraq, and 
the thesis’ findings demonstrate that sanctions are a useful nonproliferation tool.  Further, 
this thesis delivers several insights into what factors ensure policy success when using 
economic coercion to convince countries to give up their WMD. Security assurances, for 
example, can be useful in using sanctions as a nonproliferation tool.  By contrast, threats 
of regime change can create disincentives for leadership to alter WMD-acquisition 
strategies. This is especially true when the U.S. Congress adds other conditions to WMD-
specific sanctions. Inconsistencies in U.S. nonproliferation policy can also motivate states 
to acquire WMD, if countries believe Washington has turned a blind eye to an enemy’s 
WMD programs. This thesis takes these insights forward to examine the evolving 
sanctions regime against Iran’s nuclear program.  It concludes that, without cautious 
adjustment to U.S. policy, these sanctions are likely to fail. 
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I. THE QUESTION OF SANCTIONS AND PROLIFERATION 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The major research question of this thesis is whether sanctions designed to stop 
the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) an effective tool of national 
security strategy?  I intend to study if sanctions work as a part of nonproliferation 
strategy and examine the applicability of sanctions theory to proliferation. I seek to 
answer if sanctions prevent states from seeking WMD or, if states have already embarked 
as proliferators, do sanctions effectively disrupt and degrade their efforts?  Further, I 
intend to study how and when sanctions can be deemed successful and ultimately lifted. I 
also intend to study the hidden costs and consequences of sanctions and conceptually 
explore the point at which sanctions designed to stop proliferation might harm and 
degrade other national security goals. Finally, at what point does an unsuccessful 
sanctions regime culminate and do other options need to be explored?  With these 
questions in mind, I seek to examine the utility on the future employment of sanctions as 
a nonproliferation tool. 
B. IMPORTANCE  
WMD holds a place of primacy in national security strategy. A review of the U.S. 
National Security Strategies from 1990–2010 reveals that stopping the spread of WMD 
has been a national priority across four administrations. The fear of WMD fueled the U.S. 
decision to invade Iraq and has placed the U.S. and Iran on a course of growing 
confrontation. There is an extensive literature on the effectiveness of sanctions that 
indicates they generally yield mixed results. Despite the inconclusiveness of the literature 
and actual results in practice, sanctions remain a primary tool for economic statecraft and 
coercive diplomacy. For example, from the period of 1992–1996, the U.S. sanctioned 35 
different countries effecting 42 percent of the world’s population.1  The interaction of the 
issues of WMD and sanctions is therefore worth consideration. 
                                                 
1 Daniel W Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations. 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 7. 
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There are circumstances where sanctions work in service of certain goals and 
some cases where they have played a role in the reversal of states’ WMD ambitions. 
However, many politicians and pundits view sanctions as a weak compromise when they 
feel like they need to do something yet do not have the political will for military action. 
In other cases, sanctions are treated as a pro forma action in the process leading up to 
war—to purportedly “give peace a chance” while war plans are being refined.   
The Obama administration believes that non-proliferation regimes can be 
strengthened, and that the United States can set the example when it comes to nuclear 
disarmament. This optimism has run headlong into Iranian nuclear ambitions and, once 
again, sanctions have been imposed in an attempt to coerce a state to abandon its WMD 
ambitions. All of this is happening against the backdrop of a lingering global economic 
crisis, more than a decade of war that has drained U.S. political credibility especially 
regarding military action against WMD, and shrinking military budgets. Sanctions have 
been viewed as a meaningful alternative to war, and given today’s circumstances, they 
may be perceived as the only affordable alternative as well. However, despite their 
seeming utility there does not appear to be a consensus on evaluating the probability of 
sanctions creating the intended effects desired by sanctioning nations, especially 
concerning proliferation. If sanctions affect proliferation, how and why do they work or 
fail?  The past can inform present and future policy decisions.    
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The major question I hope to evaluate is the overall effectiveness of sanctions as 
part of NP/CP strategy and to see how my findings apply to current U.S. national security 
challenges, such as Iran’s nuclear program.   First, I define sanctions as economic 
pressure brought to bear against a state to produce a political outcome. Sanctions can take 
several forms including weapons trade restrictions, financial restrictions, and trade 
embargoes. They may be unilateral or multilateral actions. Whatever form they take, 
sanctions are designed to coerce a result. Secondly, I define WMD to include nuclear 
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weapons as defined by Article I of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT)2, 
chemical weapons as defined by Article II of the Chemical Weapons Convention 
(CWC)3, and biological weapons as defined by Article I of the Biological and Toxic 
Weapons Convention (BWC)4. My research will not focus on the proliferation of 
delivery systems such as ballistic missiles, artillery, and bombs, as these are inherently 
conventional until armed with WMD. Further, the case studies will be primarily focused 
on nuclear proliferation as the most dangerous and destabilizing form of WMD. 
With both sanctions and WMD defined, I intend to evaluate the effectiveness of 
sanctions as a NP/CP strategy in a qualitative assessment of case studies. My initial 
hypothesis is that sanctions, when combined with existing compliance and proliferation 
regimes, are somewhat effective at countering, but not ending, WMD programs. States 
that are determined above all things to acquire WMD can and will succeed, but their 
efforts can be severely disrupted and degraded by raising costs and extending timelines.   
Sanctions appear somewhat less effective at coercing other behaviors beyond 
proliferation. When linked with other issues such as terrorism, human rights, or other 
internal state behaviors, sanctions become less effective. They lose all effectiveness when 
linked with regime survival. Once targets determine that regime survival is at stake, no 
amount of sanctions or other coercive methods will force compliance and abandonment 
of WMD programs. My initial hypothesis is that WMD sanctions are most effective when 
combined with incentives for compliance and assurances of regime survival. Further, 
linking WMD proliferation with other issues may degrade sanction effectiveness.   
Concerning compliance and the lifting of sanctions, my initial hypothesis is that 
the lifting of sanctions and verification of compliance are problematic, especially when 
                                                 
2 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (The United Nations, 1968) accessed on May 
30, 2012, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/trty/16281.htm . 
3 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on Their Destruction (Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 
1992),accessed on May 30, 2012, http://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/. 
4 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (New York: The United Nations, 1972), accessed on 




WMD proliferation has been linked to other problems. Sanctions are often a method of 
punishment and the enemies of target states often have a stake in seeing that punishment 
continue. Further, at a certain point, sanctions can run the risk of creating problems, such 
as a humanitarian crisis bigger than the one they are trying to solve.   There is a point 
where sanctions are no longer a prudent tool for national security. The United States 
possesses the military power to contain or deter any state regardless of whether it 
possesses WMD or not. Fewer WMD in the world is assumed to be better, yet there are 
points where strategies of containment or engagement may be more prudent when dealing 
with aspiring proliferators.   
D. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is organized into five chapters. Chapter I will be a statement of the 
initial problem, the framework of my hypothesis regarding the effectiveness of sanctions 
as a nonproliferation tool, and a literature review of sanctions theory and practice. 
Chapter II will be an introduction to the case studies and South Africa. Chapters III and 
IV are the Libya and Iraq case studies. Chapter IV is devoted to analyzing the lessons 
from the case studies. Chapter V will be a final assessment of the hypothesis and an 
examination of future policy recommendations especially with regards to ongoing the 
ongoing proliferation issue of Iran. 
E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. The Rise of Sanctions 
In the 1990s as the Cold War ended, three issues came to the fore in international 
relations. The first was the problem of rogue states, and the second was the proliferation 
of WMD. In addition, the 1990s were also the so-called sanctions decade and saw a 
massive increase in the employment of economic sanctions as a coercive tool in 
international relations. A nexus quickly formed among the three issues. Rogue states 
desired WMD and sanctions were used to counter these desires. Sanctions were seen as a 
viable alternative to war; however, as the sanctions decade progressed, the international 
community became increasingly wary of their usefulness, which led it to adopt news way 
of thinking about sanctions. This literature review will explore the evolution in sanctions 
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theory and practice, touch on gaps in the literature, and assess the usefulness of the 
literature when dealing with the issue of proliferation.   
The gap between sanctions theory and ultimate results are reminiscent of other 
debates in modern strategic history. Airpower theorist Giulio Douhet was the first theorist 
to outline the theory of strategic bombing. Central to his thesis were the ideas that 
modern warfare would make no distinction between soldier and civilian and that airpower 
could shatter countries, and destroy the morale of the population who would then force 
their governments to sue for peace.5  These ideas would be put to the test in the Second 
World War. It would take atomic bombs to force Japan to submit from the air, and this 
was only after years of total war that had all but destroyed the country. Before the atomic 
bombs were dropped, the issue was already decided. Japan was doomed—how was just a 
matter of accounting. Ever since, airpower has sought to produce more precise and potent 
results without the onerous moral burden of nuclear weapons. Realizing Douhet’s vision 
was just a matter of technological innovation. The iron bombs of WWII evolved into 
ultra-precise laser and satellite guided weapons. Thousand plane raids gave way to 
“shock and awe” and Predator drones. Yet, the results are the same. Populations and 
nations rarely allow themselves to be bombed into submission.   
The evolution in the theory of sanctions follows much the same path of airpower 
in a constant quest for more precise, bloodless results. The Douhet equivalent of 
sanctions theory was actually a team of analysts from the Institute for International 
Economics composed of Gary Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schot, and Kimberly Elliot. First 
published in the 1980s and up to its third edition, their seminal work Economic Sanctions 
Reconsidered (ESR) concluded that economic sanctions were effective 36 percent of the 
time.6  It was the first “large N” study of sanctions and initially considered 103 cases. 
Further editions captured more cases that reinforced the idea that sanctions could achieve 
                                                 
5 David. MacIsaac, “Voices from the Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists,” in Makers of Modern 
Strategy, ed. by Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 630. 
6 Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Kimberly Ann Elliot, and Jeffrey J. Schott, Economic Sanctions 
Reconsidered: History and Current Policy, second edition, volumes 1–3 (Washington D.C.: Institute for 
International Economics, 1985), 80. 
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results around a third of the time. With a record of accomplishment like that, sanctions 
could be seen as a cheap alternative to war. 
Further, the each edition of the book contains nine recommendations for senders 
to follow that are widely cited and repeated in the literature. Summarized and 
paraphrased, the commandments in the third edition are:  
1. “Don’t bite off more than you can chew.”  Sanctions with modest goals work 
best and strong countries are harder to compel. 
2.  “Friends are more likely to Comply than Adversaries.”  Sanctions against 
trading partners or friends were likely to work, but sanctions against 
adversarial nations were likely to fail. 
3. “Beware Autocratic Regimes.”  Economic coercion is unlikely to work on 
dictators, and conversely, has a better change of working on democracies. 
4. “Slam the Hammer, Don’t Turn the Screw.”  Sanctions that are implemented 
quickly are the best as they leave the target little time to react and adjust.   
5. “More is Not Necessarily Merrier.” Large coalitions of sender countries do 
not necessarily make sanctions more likely to succeed. 
6. “Choose the Right Tool for the Job.” Deploying sanctions along with military 
or covert actions against belligerents can serve to diminish military capacity 
but is unlikely to result in regime change or policy reversals with the target. 
Senders should be clear on their goals. 
7. “Don’t Be a Cheapskate or Spendthrift.” Sanctions will have costs to both 
senders and the target. Senders deploying sanctions need to balance the cost of 
sanctions or risk eroding support for their actions. However, without inflicting 
some degree of economic pain, sanctions are unlikely to work. 
8.  “Look Before You Leap.”  Sanctions can be a Pandora’s Box of hidden costs; 
therefore senders should think through both their means and objective before 
deploying sanctions.7 
                                                 
7 Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott,  Kimberly Ann Elliot, and Barbara Oegg , Economic 
Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy, Third edition, (Washington D.C.: Institute for 
International Economics, 2007), 162–178. 
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In addition to the eight recommendations for senders to consider before deploying 
sanctions, the ESR study list four reason why sanctions will fail: 
1. “Sanctions are Not up to the Task.” Often sanctions simply aren’t enough 
to change the behavior of a foreign country. An example in the ESR study 
is that sanctions are unlikely to end military adventures once they have 
begun. Senders cannot sanction their way to peace.8 
2. “Sanctions Create Their Own Antidotes.”  Sanctions may unify popular 
support for the government in the target country and send the target in 
search of economic alternatives. 
3. “Black Knights.” Sanctions may prompt allies or conferees to assist the 
sender in off-setting the effects of sanctions. These alliances may be 
formed because of many interests ranging from ideological to commercial 
interests.  
4. “Sanctions may Alienate Allies Abroad and Business Interests at Home.”  
All sanctions create some degree of economic pain. A country that is 
allied with a sanction sender may have interests in the target. 
Alternatively, business interests within the sender country may be effected 
by sanctions and may exert influence in domestic political processes.9  
With the intellectual framework laid, and the Cold War ending, the world was 
primed for more multilateral cooperation, especially concerning the sanctioning powers 
vested in Chapter VII of the UN Charter.10  U.S. national security policy reflected this 
new ideal. The U.S. had just led the winning coalition against Iraq in Operation Desert 
Storm in 1991 and President George H.W. Bush articulated his vision for a “New World 
Order.”  This would be enshrined in the 1991 National Security Strategy in which 
President Bush wrote, “we have within our grasp an extraordinary possibility that few 
                                                 
8 Ibid., 69. 
9 Ibid., 7–8. 
10 David Cortright and George A. Lopez, The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 1. 
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generations have enjoyed—to build a new international system in accordance with our 
own values and ideals, as old patterns and certainties crumble around us.”11  
Thus began what David Cortright and George A. Lopez characterized as The 
Sanctions Decade in their 2000 book of the same title. Cortright and Lopez observed that 
in the first 45 years of its existence, the UN Security Council had only imposed sanctions 
twice, against Rhodesia in 1966 and South Africa in 1977.12  While the secretive South 
African WMD programs had not been specifically targeted, the success of sanctions 
against the apartheid regime was viewed by the international community as the first 
major success at sanctioning a rogue state into major policy reversals. With this success 
behind it, the 1990s saw the UN imposing sanctions across the globe with a mixed record 
of success. In Yugoslavia and North Korea, sanctions helped force political settlements, 
although in the case of North Korea the settlement did not prove enduring. Sanctions 
helped compel Libya to turn the Lockerbie bombers over to an international tribunal. On 
the other hand, sanctions did nothing to end genocide and humanitarian crisis in places 
like Sudan, Haiti, Somalia, Rwanda, and Angola.  
However, it was Iraq, where the UN imposed the longest running and most 
intrusive sanctions regime in the history of the world, which would become the test lab 
for sanctions theory and practice. 13  It was ultimately viewed as a failed experiment—
Saddam Hussein remained unbowed to the international community while the people of 
Iraq suffered unjustly. The suffering of the Iraqi people combined with Saddam 
Hussein’s perceived intransigence forced cracks into the intellectual framework of the 
sanctions decade.   
In a counter-argument to the ESR study, Robert Pape argued in a 1997 article that 
sanctions had actually only succeeded in five of the 103 cases cited by Huffbauer and his 
team.14  Other scholars observed that unilateral U.S. sanctions from 1970–1997 were 
                                                 
11 The National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington D.C.: The White House, 1991), v. 
12 Cortright and Lopez, The Sanctions Decade, 1. 
13 David Cortright, and George A. Lopez. “Containing Iraq: Sanctions Worked,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 
83, No. 4 (Jul. - Aug., 2004), 91. 
14 Robert A Pape  "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work,” International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2 
(Autumn 1997), 105. 
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only successful 13 percent of the time.15  Cortright and Lopez narrowed their scholarship 
to the cases in the 1990s. Their studies showed less than stellar results. Sanctions worked 
to achieve some post-war goals with Iraq but they had not forced it out of Kuwait. Nor 
had they compelled Saddam Hussein to comply completely with UN demands to disarm.   
The concessions wrung from Iraq were accompanied by the extensive use of military 
force.16  Additionally, the sanctions against Iraq created a humanitarian crisis, especially 
for children, and were attacked from the left and right as unjust and ineffective, 
respectively. In a 1999 Foreign Affairs article John and Karl Mueller characterized the 
international efforts against Iraq as “Sanctions of Mass Destruction.”  They argued that 
the threat from rogue states and WMD was overblown and that the sanctions on Iraq may 
be responsible for killing more people than every nuclear, chemical, or biological attack 
since their entrance into the modern world.17  While the numbers are debatable, the point 
is well made. Sanctions were doing more harm than good. 
Cortright and Lopez’s scholarship pointed out several flaws within the sanctions 
system. Foremost, economic success does not guarantee political success.18 Iraq was 
devastated economically yet was noncompliant in regard to WMD.   Further, the UN 
system lacked the ability to administer sanctions, and there are tensions between the goals 
of the Security Council and those of member states.19  They also concluded that sanctions 
are sometimes used as an alternative or even as a prelude to war.20  All of this was 
illustrated with Iraq. As early as 1994, U.S. officials had hinted that as long as Saddam 
Hussein was in power the sanctions would remain.21  Further, the modest goals called for 
                                                 
15 Robert Carbaugh, “Are Economic Sanctions Useful in Discouraging the Proliferation of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction?" World Economics, Vol. 9, No. 4 (2008), 197. 
16 Cortright and Lopez, The Sanctions Decade, 205–207. 
17 John Mueller and Karl Mueller, "Sanctions of Mass Destruction,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 3 
(May/June 1999). 
18 Cortright and Lopez, The Sanctions Decade, 3. 
19 Ibid., 5–6. 
20 Ibid., 6. 
21 Paul F. Horvitz, “Christopher Sees Sanctions in Place As Long as Saddam Stays in Power : U.S. 
Message to Iraq Move Troops or Else,” The New York Times, October 17, 1994. 
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by Hufbauer et al. were replaced by unlimited goals when President Clinton signed the 
Iraq Liberation Act in 1998 that made regime change official U.S. policy.22   
Political scientist Daniel Drezner also explored the sanctions decade in his book 
The Sanctions Paradox. He examined the interaction of cost on both the part of the 
sender and the target, combined with the threat of conflict. He concluded that heighten 
expectations of conflict between the sender and the target will lower sanction 
effectiveness.23 Drezner also concluded that large asymmetries in cost between the 
sender and the target, combined with lowered expectations of conflict bring about the 
most significant concessions.24  His conclusions mirrored that of the ESR study, 
especially concerning economic engagement and integration.25 In short, Drezner 
concluded that countries that could maximize pain for gain would be the most successful 
at economic coercion. However, it was the question of who exactly was getting hurt as 
economic pain was traded for political gain that began caused shifts in thinking among 
analysts. 
Some began to link sanctions to morality. In a 2003 article titled “Economic 
Sanctions and the Problem of Evil,” Adeno Addis concluded that sanctions don’t work at 
changing regime behavior, run counter to other international norms such as human rights, 
and merely served to reinforce authoritarian regimes’ grasp on power. He further 
discredited the idea that populations in targeted countries had any ability to influence 
their governments.26  Instead, he argued that outlaw and pariah regimes were viewed as 
the states themselves. Populations that the international community meant to save from 
authoritarian regimes by imposing sanctions now were  collateral damage, harmed from 
both within and without.27 Addis concluded that the real purpose sanctions served was 
                                                 
22 Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, Public Law 105–338, The 105th Congress, accessed on October 28, 
2012, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-105publ338/html/PLAW-105publ338.htm. 
23 Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox, 5. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid., 313. 
26 Adeno Addis, "Economic Sanctions and the Problem of Evil," Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 25, 
No. 3  (August 2003), 584. 
27 Ibid., 605.  
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one of identity—separating the good self from the evil other. In terms of proliferation, 
this is counterproductive. Which is more important, punishing evil or getting rid of 
WMD?   
2. The Evolution to “Smart Sanctions” 
The failures of the sanctions decade sparked an intellectual searching that became 
known as the “Interlaken Process.”  Convened by the Swiss government and worked in 
conferences in 1998 and 1999, this process sought to reform the sanctions theory and 
bring about a more refined approach of best practices for making sanctions more 
effective.28  These practices came to be known as “smart sanctions” in which the regime 
and not the state would be the target. Arne Tostensen summarized the literature on smart 
sanctions in a 2002 article titled “Are Smart Sanctions Feasible?”  Tostensen concluded 
that the idea of smart sanctions had merit, but that the literature points to just as many 
problems with the implementation of smarts sanctions as dumb ones that had been 
designed to replace. Further, smart sanctions raised a host of new issues. Foremost, smart 
sanctions suffered the same problem of defining success, especially when the sender’s 
goals varied.29  This proved problematic for proliferation as the sender’s agendas were  
often broader than just the elimination of WMD. Further, sanctions seeking to avoid 
humanitarian impact required a deeper understanding of the targeted state’s baselines.30  
A targeted regime could claim that the smart sanctions were causing a humanitarian crisis 
within the targeted state, and the international community might not be able to assess the 
validity of the regime’s claims. In addition, regimes had to be deeply understood and 
mapped in order to be adequately targeted by smart sanctions, and even with adequate 
target data, sanctions were unlikely to work against the most authoritarian regimes.31  
This would indicate problems in targeting proliferators like North Korea. Further, the 
literature on smart sanctions indicated that the international community and the UN 
                                                 
28 Thomas J Biersteker, Targeted Financial Sanctions: A Manual for Design and Implementation 
(Providence, RI: Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, Brown University, 2001), x.  
29 Arne Tostensen, "Are Smart Sanctions Feasible?” World Politics, Vol. 54, No. 3, (April 2002), 387. 
30 Ibid., 378. 
31 Ibid. 
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lacked the means to conduct the detailed assessments for smart sanctions to work.32  
Finally, Tostensen concluded that smart sanctions are no less costly to enforce than 
conventional ones.33   
The genesis of smart sanctions soon collided with world events. The new 
administration of President George W. Bush was wary of multilateralism in the first place 
and was soon confronted by the attacks on September 11, 2001. The perceived nexus of 
rogue states, WMD, and terrorism assumed a top place in national security policy. In the 
2002 National Security Strategy (published in September 2002, a year after the attacks), 
President Bush wrote, “The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of 
radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking 
weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with 
determination. The United States will not allow these efforts to succeed.”34  A few 
months later, President Bush labeled North Korea, Iran, and Iraq the “axis of evil.”35  
Iraq, ever the poster-child for failed sanctions and multilateralism, was now squarely in 
the sites of the Bush administration’s Global War on Terror, and the invasion of Iraq for 
the reason of disarming Saddam Hussein’s WMD was soon underway.   
Writing in 2004, after it became clear that Iraq did not have WMD, the team of 
David Cortright and George Lopez authored a Foreign Affairs article titled “Containing 
Iraq: Sanctions Worked.”  They argued that the “unique synergy of sanctions and 
inspections” had eliminated Iraq’s WMD capability and eroded its military before the 
war.36  Further, they argued the package of new smart sanctions enacted by the UN in 
2002 against Iraq would have finally cemented a program structured for long-term 
success.37  The authors argued that the intelligence community ignored the success of the 
                                                 
32 Ibid., 394. 
33 Ibid., 398 
34 The National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington D.C.: The Whitehouse, 2002). 
35,”President Delivers State of the Union Address,” January 29, 2002, The President George W. Bush 
White House Archives, accessed on December 15, 2011.  http://georgewbush-
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       36 David Cortright and George A. Lopez. “Containing Iraq: Sanctions Worked,” Foreign Affairs, 
Vol. 83, No. 4 (July/August 2004), 91. 
37 Ibid., 91. 
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sanctions against Iraq and saw Saddam Hussein’s attempts at evasion and resistance as 
confirmation of their worst fears.38  They admitted that Iraq was able to obtain billions 
from illicit sanctions evasion tactics, but that it was not enough to totally re-arm and 
rebuild the military, especially in light of the sanctions that prohibited Iraq from openly 
buying weapons. The illicit funds were just enough to maintain the military and regime.39  
The tragedy of Iraq demonstrated the complexity involved with coerced disarmament. 
How can enemies ever be sure? 
The Bush administration was forced to admit that Iraq did not possess WMD. 
Further, the punishing sanctions regime imposed on Iraq prior to the invasion made 
reconstruction all that much harder and fueled the insurgency. The cost of the “yacht” of 
Iraq was almost too expensive for the U.S. to bear. The 2006 National Security Strategy 
blamed faulty intelligence on Iraq’s WMD and stated that Saddam Hussein admitted, in 
post-capture interrogations, that he had been maintaining a posture of strategic ambiguity 
as a means of deterring Iran.40  Despite the lack of WMD in Iraq, the Bush administration 
argued the war had a demonstration effect that had prompted Libya to give up its WMD 
programs. The 2006 National Security Strategy emphasized this by stating, “Saddam’s 
strategy of bluff, denial, and deception is a dangerous game that dictators play at their 
peril.”41  This appeared to be a game that Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi was unwilling to 
play when he announced his willingness to give up his WMD in late 2003. 
Cortright and George Lopez argued against what Representative Tom Lantos of 
California termed the “pedagogic value” of the Iraq war.42  They concluded that 
Gaddafi’s disarmament was the result of a long-standing negotiations process. Writing in 
the Mediterranean Quarterly, Randall Newnham argued that a combination of carrot and 
stick approaches were what actually led to Libya’s WMD disarmament. Once the U.S. 
quietly assured Gaddafi that regime change was no longer its goal and Gaddafi 
                                                 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid., 98 
40 The National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2006), 
23. 
41 Ibid., 24. 
42  Cortright and  Lopez, “Containing Iraq: Sanctions Worked,” 102. 
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demonstrated his discontinued support for terrorism, negotiations took place in good 
faith.43   
In a way, the sanctions against Libya can be characterized as proto-smart 
sanctions. In the 1990s the U.S. boycotted Libya’s oil and called for the UN to do the 
same. Europe was largely dependent on Libyan oil and balked at an embargo.44  Instead, 
a series of financial, travel, arms, and oil field equipment sanctions were adopted. The 
effects were not catastrophic at first, but fluctuations in oil prices and decay in the ability 
to produce oil began to have an effect. The quality of life dropped in Libya and Gaddafi 
faced the prospect of attempted coups, growing civil unrest, and rising Islamist activity.45 
Further, the newly created Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) netted a major success 
when it intercepted a ship destined for Libya filled with nuclear centrifuge parts procured 
from the A.Q. Khan network.46 Arguably, PSI is a smart sanction tool. Instead of a 
punishing total embargo, Libya was gradually squeezed into compliance, and precise 
targeting of illicit materials created more success than a more costly system like that 
imposed on Iraq. Newnham argued this was the final critical step in convincing Gaddafi 
that his proliferation efforts would not succeed.47  Libya chose to come in from the cold. 
The demonstration effect of Iraq did not appear to have an impact on other 
proliferators. North Korean conducted its first nuclear test in 2006, and Syria started 
construction on a North Korean-designed nuclear reactor that was bombed by Israel in 
2007. Iran proceeded with its covert nuclear program. The Obama administration 
inherited this security landscape. In his 2009 Prague speech, President Obama signaled a 
                                                 
 43  Randall Newnham, “Carrots, Sticks, and Bombs: The End of Libya’s WMD 
Program,” Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol.  20, No. 3 (2009), 78. 
44 Cortright and  Lopez, The Sanctions Decade, 112. 
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renewed emphasis on nonproliferation along with the goal of reduction in nuclear 
arsenals.48   
In a 2007 article published in the journal Survival, Rose Gottemoeller, now acting 
Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, argued that 
sanctions theory and practice had evolved to the point where the U.S. now had  the tools 
necessary to pursue a true smart sanctions policy. She concluded that U.S. economic 
institutional power combined with financial provisions in the Patriot Act made smart 
sanctions feasible.49  Further, the U.S. now had laws to force U.S. companies to divest 
from states like Iran, and new banking laws designed to fight terrorism could also be used 
to combat proliferation.50  Her theories are now being put to the test as the U.S. is 
attempting to force Iran to give up its nuclear ambitions with a smart sanctions regime. 
WMD is featured prominently in the sanctions literature because WMD is a driver of 
international conflict and often one of the root causes of a sanctions regime. Writing in 
World Economics, Robert Carbaugh explored whether sanctions were useful in 
discouraging proliferation. His case studies of Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and Libya lead 
him to the same conclusions reflected in the rest of literature—sanctions don’t usually 
work at persuading states to change policies.51  In this case, there is a 25 percent success 
rate for sanctions designed to stop nuclear weapons. Yet, the article does little to explain 
why sanctions fail to stop proliferation beyond the fact that sanctions generally fail 
anyway.  
Michael Brozoska has examined the effectiveness of arms embargoes. While not a 
specific study of WMD, his examination of efforts to stop the proliferation of 
conventional weapons might be useful for the study of the spread of unconventional ones. 
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49 Rose Gottemoeller, "The Evolution of Sanctions in Practice and Theory," Survival, Vol. 49 Issue 4, 
2007), 103–104. 
50 Ibid., 107–108   
51 Robert Carbaugh,  "Are Economic Sanctions Useful in Discouraging the Proliferation of Weapons 
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Brozoska finds the same middling record of accomplishment for arms embargoes as other 
economic sanctions. They are often imposed yet rarely affect a policy reversal in targeted 
states.52  He also concludes that embargoes do not cause states to reverse nuclear 
policies, yet the argument can be made that the PSI interdiction against Libya was a type 
of “embargo” that succeeded although the literature cannot answer if Gaddafi would have 
continued along the nuclear path had the centrifuges been delivered. This exposes the key 
gaps in the literature. There are few specific examinations of WMD proliferation and 
sanctions. The central question of why have sanctions appear to have failed in most cases 
to stop proliferation and if will they continue to do so, especially in light of the new smart 
sanctions era, has not been adequately addressed in the literature. Smart sanctions and 
their role in proliferation have yet to be fully explored. Conclusion and Implications 
In conclusion, sanctions theory has evolved in the past two decades yet there still 
exists a large gap between theory and practice. There is little consensus on the overall 
effectiveness of sanctions as a coercive tool, and the record of sanctions’ ability to stop 
the proliferation of WMD is mixed. The eight commandments and four precautions of the 
ESR study and Drezner’s conclusions in The Sanctions Paradox still hold explanatory 
and predictive power, yet for a variety of reasons they are often unheeded. The so-called 
smart sanctions era still presents myriad problems for the international community and 
some current sanctions regimes were inherited from the previous era. Trust and 
verification remain major problems, especially for countries that are already labeled 
pariahs as well as proliferators. Policy makers crafting proliferation strategies that include 
sanctions as a tool face both complex political and technical challenges. Clearly, 
diplomacy is a better alternative to war; however, in order for sanctions to work, 
diplomatic compromise must be part of the equation. Sanctions designed solely to punish 
are designed to fail.   
                                                 
52 Michael Brzoska, "Measuring the Effectiveness of Arms Embargoes," Peace Economics, Peace 
Science and Public Policy, Vol. 14, Issue 2 (2008), 14. 
 17 
F. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The analytical approach to this thesis will be the use of comparative case studies 
to examine the effectiveness of sanctions against WMD. The case studies I have chosen 
are South Africa, Libya, and Iraq. These three cases represent nonproliferation successes 
where sanctions played a role in ending proliferation. Further, each of these cases has a 
conclusion from which lessons can be drawn. For this reason, I have excluded cases like 
Syria and North Korea, which are both proliferators, but are also ongoing cases where, as 
of this writing, there is little potential for reversal beyond regime change.   
All of these cases to some degree involve the pursuit of chemical, biological, and 
nuclear weapons but will focus on nuclear weapons as the most destabilizing and 
destruction type of WMD. The South African is an outlier case that was a target of 
sanctions that were not specifically designed to coerce it from giving up its secretive 
WMD programs yet they appear to have contributed to South Africa’s decision to disarm. 
This disarmament included several fielded nuclear weapons.    
I intend to examine the case studies against existing sanctions literature such as 
the ESR study and Drezner’s conclusions. I will examine each country in the case study 
with regards to its diplomatic and security situation, the sanctions regime leveled against 
it, and the history of its proliferation. I will examine how each of these elements 
interacted and what caused each case to be a nonproliferation success. I will also examine 
what shortcoming or failures resulted from each case and then analyze the applicable 
lessons. Finally, I will apply the knowledge and conclusions from the case studies as they 
apply to future U.S. policy regarding using sanctions as a nonproliferation tool.   
Regarding methods and sources, I will make use of the sources for sanctions 
theory described in my literature review and others listed in my bibliography. For my 
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II. INTRODUCTION TO THE CASE STUDIES AND SOUTH 
AFRICA’S WHITE BOMB 
A. INTRODUCTION: THREE VICTORIES 
The following three chapters will be devoted to the examination of three 
nonproliferation success stories—South Africa, Libya, and Iraq— and the role that 
economic sanctions played in reversing proliferation. Although chemical and biological 
weapons were a factor in all the cases, the studies will focus mostly on the nuclear issue 
as the most destabilizing and destructive aspect of WMD proliferation.   
The case studies begin with South Africa. Although the South African 
proliferation case is one of the least studied in the literature it represents the biggest 
nonproliferation success story to date. South Africa deployed and then gave up a small 
nuclear arsenal. While its nuclear program was only tangentially targeted by sanctions, 
economic coercion played a large roll at ending apartheid ushering in what came to be 
known as “the sanctions decade.”  Sanctions were also useful as an incentive to insure 
that South Africa did, in fact, dismantle its nuclear programs. 
The next case study is Libya, which demonstrates the usefulness of sanctions to 
force states to moderate their behavior as well as stopping proliferation. Contrasted with 
the other cases, Libya was nowhere near being a successful nuclear proliferators and only 
managed to acquire a small chemical arsenal. Further, sanctions weren’t the only factor 
that caused Gaddafi to give up his WMD programs, but they played a large role. Libya 
also demonstrates a model for how sanctions can work to achieve nonproliferation. The 
goals were limited and the senders of the sanctions were open to negotiation—a “carrot” 
and “stick” approach. 
The final case study is Iraq, which is a pyrrhic nonproliferation victory. The 
sanctions regime against Iraq represents the end to the sanctions decade and ushered in 
the “smart sanctions” era that will be tested in Iran. Saddam Hussein Iraq’s was the most 
dangerous and destabilizing of the cases. Iraq never fielded a nuclear weapon, but had 
Desert Storm not forced the end to its nuclear program, it would have been able to do so. 
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Further, Iraq fielded and used an extensive chemical arsenal against both internal and 
external enemies. It also had an extensive biological weapons program.   
It took two wars and two decades of sanctions to put an end to the Iraq case. The 
struggle against Saddam Hussein’s proliferation illustrates everything that can go wrong 
with sanctions. The goals of the senders split, Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship proved 
resilient to economic coercion, and instead of being leery of negotiating with dictators, 
the U.S. ruled it out, deciding first to legislate regime change and then label Iraq as part 
of the axis of evil. Instead of constructing policy around the goal of putting an end to 
Saddam Hussein’s proliferation, the U.S. adopted the goal of ending the dictator himself. 
The U.S. was able to easily seize Iraq, but the failure to find WMD followed by lingering 
insurgency that the U.S. limped away from damaged U.S. credibility in combating other 
proliferators. 
B. SOUTH AFRICA AND THE WHITE BOMB 
Long regarded as one of the most successful sanctions episodes in history, the 
multi-decade long struggle to reverse South Africa’s racist apartheid policies paved the 
way for  what became known as “the sanctions decade” in the 1990s. South Africa is also 
regarded as proliferation success story. It was the first nation to seek, acquire, and then 
give up nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and is now regarded as a 
nonproliferation paragon. However, a closer examination of the South African case study 
reveals a mixed record regarding both sanctions and nonproliferation efforts. Despite arm 
embargoes, sanctions, and near total international isolation, South Africa was not only 
able to produce chemical and biological weapons; it fielded six operational nuclear 
weapons in almost total secrecy. South Africa’s contradictory motives for acquiring these 
weapons and the potential scenarios for which the white government envisioned using 
them are also deeply troubling. This case study will focus on nuclear proliferation. 
The net effects of sanctions and other means of economic coercion contributed to 
forcing Pretoria to reform and abandon apartheid. Sanctions and embargos had little 
impact on South Africa’s decision to proliferate, and when added to a worsening security 
situation in the 1970s and early 1980s, seemed to have encouraged it. However, the 
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normative effects of nonproliferation regimes combined with an improving security 
situation in the late 1980s and South Africa’s desire to end sanctions and return to 
normalcy proved valuable in encouraging Pretoria to give up its WMD as a sign of good 
faith with the desires of the international community. Sanctions didn’t stop South African 
proliferation, but they were a useful incentive for ending it. The South Africa case also 
serves to illustrate how a smart sanctions regime could have ended both apartheid and 
proliferation more quickly that the haphazard, draw out manner in which the world 
coerced Pretoria to reverse its policies.   
1. Black Knights, Grassroots, and the Vulnerable Pariah 
South Africa was not always been a pariah. As part of the British Commonwealth, 
it had fought on the side of the allies during the First and Second World Wars and had 
strong ties with the West. The whites-only Nationalist Party took power following the 
Second World War and strengthened the segregationist policies that would come to be 
known as apartheid. South Africa left the commonwealth in 1961 and strengthened its 
repressive apartheid policies. The world reacted unfavorably. In 1964, the UN Security 
Council adopted United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 181 that 
condemned apartheid and called for a voluntary arms embargo against South Africa. In 
1970, the UN reaffirmed its condemnation of the apartheid regime with UNSRC 282 and 
renewed calls for an arms embargo. IN 1973, OPEC began an oil embargo of South 
Africa, and the voluntary arms embargo was made mandatory by UNSCR 418 in 1977.53   
The U.S. and Great Brittan complied with the arms embargo, but did not sever 
trade or impose wider sanctions. In response to the arms embargo, South Africa, with 
Israeli cooperation, developed a robust and profitable domestic arms production 
industry.54  South African create the Armscor company that was able to produced 
sophisticated weaponry for both South African Defense Forces (SADF) and the export 
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market. The South Africa WMD and missile programs grew out of the domestic arms 
industry. 
By the late 1980s, the volume of international outrage against South Africa had 
grown to the point where a coalition of Western nations, including the United Kingdom 
and the United States, adopted severe economic sanctions against South Africa. However, 
these sanctions were far from perfect or comprehensive. The ESR study rates the 
sanctions episode against South Africa as a success where all the goals of the senders 
were met. However, the ESR study rates the influence of sanctions compelling changes in 
South African as middling.55  They did affect Pretoria’s behavior, but were far from 
delivering the killing blow to apartheid. In fact, despite its growing isolation and apparent 
vulnerability to a comprehensive sanctions regime, South Africa was able to grow its 
economy until the late 1970s when the South African government’s murder of protest 
leader Steve Bilko galvanized international reaction against apartheid.56  Up until this 
point, South Africa’s economy was able to thrive because of access to capital, availability 
of high-tech industry and knowledge, and overall profitability of international companies 
operating there. Apartheid may have been distasteful, but business in South Africa was 
good. Thus, the South African sanctions episode had a long list of both government and 
corporate “black knights” who were willing to overlook apartheid because of economic 
interests.  
On the surface, South Africa seemed perfectly vulnerable to sanctions especially 
from the West with which it had close trading ties, which is one factor the ESR identifies 
as likely to create successful sanctions outcomes. However, a  closer examination of the 
slow-moving sanctions regime targeting South Africa reveals a different story. The 
apartheid state was vulnerable, but not completely without friends. Further, in the 
geopolitical context of the apartheid era, the political costs of complete economic 
strangulation of and isolation of South Africa were high. South Africa was a strident anti-
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communist capitalist state directly fighting communist incursions onto the African 
continent. Its economic ties with the West made it vulnerable, but its political alignment 
against communism mitigated some of this vulnerability.  
The energy sector was one place where South Africa was particularly vulnerable. 
South Africa imported nearly all of its oil, but the OPEC embargo against it was not 
comprehensive. Iran ignored the boycott and continued to trade with South Africa. In 
addition to Iranian oil, U.S. companies accounted for 40% of South African oil imports.57 
In 1977, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) called for a total oil sales boycott of South 
Africa. The U.S. abstained from the vote, and the proposal died.58 South African paid a 
large premium for the oil it did import, but managed to keep its economy moving.59 The 
lack of domestic oil supplies also helped create South Africa’s interest in nuclear power. 
South Africa started to develop its nuclear infrastructure under the Atoms for 
Peace program and had a genuine interest in nuclear power throughout the apartheid 
period creating more vulnerability. It signed deals with the U.S. for nuclear reactors and 
fuel. Later, South Africa did not sign the NPT and did not agree to place its nuclear 
industry under IAEA safeguards. In response, the Ford administration cut off nuclear fuel 
shipments to South Africa’s highly enriched uranium (HEU) fueled Safari 1 reactor that 
had originally been procured under the Atoms for Peace program.60  The cutoff of 
nuclear fuel deeply affected the ability of South Africa to operate the Safari 1 reactor for 
a period, but never forced the reactor offline.61 The next year in 1978, as part of its 
implementation of the NPT and the larger nuclear non-proliferation, the U.S. passed the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Act (NNPA). This act prohibited nuclear trade with countries 
that were not under IAEA safeguards. Because of this, the Carter administration 
permanently cut off fuel shipments to South African in 1980.   
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However, South Africa was still able to import fuel from other sources in 
Europe.62  Because of growing international sentiment against it, South Africa had also 
started an indigenous enrichment program in 1971 and by 1981 had enriched enough fuel 
to supply its reactors. In effect, the nuclear fuel cutoff spurred proliferation by giving the 
South Africans incentive to master the nuclear fuel cycle.63 Eventually HEU fuel supplies 
from Europe were also cut off, but South Africa was now able to supply itself. The 
overall net effect of cutting of HEU supplies to South Africa was to force it to divide its 
HEU between its bomb programs and civilian reactors. South Africa was not able to 
expand its civilian nuclear power industry as it desired, but it was still able build a limited 
number of bombs.  
Against this backdrop, the international drive against apartheid began to gain 
momentum in the 1980s. Once prosperous South Africa began to struggle economically, 
but still kept its economy viable. The ESR study concluded that financiers and banks 
were more averse to dealing with nations struggling under sanctions than were goods 
traders. Traders make their money in the short term as goods and services are exchanged 
in the present; whereas, financiers must take a long-term outlook.64  South Africa did not 
have a ready commodity like oil to trade in the short term and needed access to the global 
capital markets to thrive. These economic factors were about to play a large role in the 
reversal of apartheid. 
A one-two punch was about to make South Africa a very unattractive place to 
invest. The first blow game from the grassroots divestiture campaign in which a wide 
variety of institutions like churches and unions threatened to remove their funds from 
financial institutions doing business in South Africa.65 This expanded into boycott threats 
against companies doing business in South Africa, and famously forced Coca Cola to sell 
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its South African operations.66 This combined with the continued unrest and a slowing 
economy made South Africa an unattractive place to invest. The divestiture campaign 
may have stripped up to $20 billion out of the South African economy.67 The second 
blow came with passage of the Comprehensive Antiapartheid Act (CAA) in 1986, which 
was originally vetoed by President Reagan but overridden by Congress. President Reagan 
believed in a policy of constructive engagement with South Africa compared to what he 
believed to be President Carter’s moralizing. South Africa was fighting on the right side 
of the Cold War, and from 1981 to 1986 willingly turned a blind eye towards allied and 
U.S. interests assisting the South African arms industry.68  The CAA changed all this and 
cut off all U.S. trade with South Africa making it an even less attractive place for the 
international finance system. A shift in the geopolitical context of the late Cold War 
combined with a grassroots movement that was less concerned with international 
relations than justice combined to end apartheid.   
The ESR study concludes that the grassroots divestment campaign appears to 
have been equally effective as UN and state sponsored sanctions in disrupting South 
Africa’s economy. In The Sanctions Paradox, Drezner concludes that economic 
engagement can create blocs within a country that favor change. South Africa went from 
a vibrant economy where prestigious companies like Union Carbide proudly advertised 
their presence to a pariah faced with an unsustainable system.69  Trade and engagement 
had created a large enough bloc among white South Africans to force hardliner apartheid 
President Botha from office. Reformer F.W. de Klerk assumed office and began the 
process of ending apartheid.   
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2. Apartheid and the Security State  
The struggle to end apartheid did not occur in a vacuum. South Africa also faced 
serious internal and external security threats, which gave rise to the South African 
security state. The nuclear program began when South Africa was relatively secure, but 
in the 1970s the security situation began to deteriorate which drove WMD acquisition.70  
South African faced a “brush fire” insurgency in its protectorate of Namibia. South 
Africa also became involved in civil wars in Angola and Mozambique. Newly elected 
President Carter further distanced the U.S. from South Africa, while the conflict in 
Angola escalated when Cuban troops with Soviet support directly intervened on behalf of 
the Marxist government.   The Cubans were able to defeat South African backed National 
Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) forces and Fidel Castro later 
hinted at a broader offensive.71 Soviet-supplied weaponry combined with the lingering 
effects of the arms embargo, which especially hurt the SADF air forces, stunted South 
African’s efforts against the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in 
the Angolan Civil War, and hindered the SADFs ability to destroy insurgent forces in 
Namibia during the mid-80s.72 The SADF were more than adequate to defeat any 
incursion into South Africa proper, but Pretoria was isolated, paranoid, and unable to 
decisively defeat its enemies.73  Ronald Reagan’s election and policy of cooperative 
engagement mitigated some of this, but South Africa concluded it was alone and acted 
accordingly.   
In this atmosphere of isolation, Pretoria began to fear a “total onslaught” of 
communist supported blacks would overwhelm the minority whites while the West stood 
by and watched.74  In the wake of the 1976 Soweto Uprising, the apartheid government 
also feared an internal “black tidal wave” that it would eventually look to chemical and 
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biological weapons to counter.75  South Africa decided that WMD were the answer to its 
security problems. The initial wave of sanctions and embargoes did not end apartheid nor 
discourage South African from following this course. Instead, economic coercion 
reinforced the decision to proliferate, and the arms embargo had already created a 
sophisticated defense industry capable of building WMD.76  An isolated South Africa 
became more dangerous.   
The security conditions that encouraged proliferation evaporated in the late 1980s. 
Cuban and Soviet troops withdrew from Africa in exchange for Namibian 
independence.77 The Berlin Wall came down, and the Soviet Union began to contract and 
break apart. The white political leadership came to realization that they would have to 
negotiate some kind of power sharing agreement with the blacks. The threat of “total 
onslaught” was gone taking with it the raison d’être for the South African security state 
and any hopes that Western powers might rush to assist a collapsing South African state. 
White leadership began to realize that preserving apartheid meant destroying South 
Africa. In the meantime, South Africa sought and acquired WMD. 
3. The White Bomb 
South Africa did not start out as a nuclear proliferator. As noted above, it a 
participated in the Atoms for Peace program, and it was a member of the IAEA. South 
Africa also played a role in the British and U.S. nuclear programs because it had large 
stocks of uranium that it sold to both the U.S. and the UK.78   In compliance with the 
growing set of global nuclear norms, it signed the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty.79 The 
international condemnation over apartheid had not yet affected its nuclear dealings with 
the outside world, and starting with the Atoms for Peace deal and moving forward in the 
early 1960s, the South African nuclear program began as a commercial venture aimed at 
power generation. The government embarked on a plan to develop its natural resources, 
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human capital, and nuclear infrastructure.80 South African began research into uranium 
enrichment as part of its commercial nuclear power industry.81  This also meant that 
South Africa had the first step required for nuclear proliferation—access to nuclear 
material and the ability to master the nuclear fuel cycle.  
While the full history of South Africa’s decision to go nuclear is still shrouded in 
conjecture, on the surface South Africa’s nuclear weapons efforts appear to have 
originated in the idea of commercial uses for so-called peaceful nuclear explosions 
(PNEs).82  The South African government approved research into PNEs in 1971 that 
reflected the norms at the time. Both the U.S. and Soviet Union had PNE programs and 
PNEs were permitted in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.83  However, the decision to 
pursue PNEs proved fateful and provided the foundation for a military nuclear weapons 
program. 
The decision to shift to nuclear weapons began as the bush wars heated up, and 
South Africa drifted further and further away from the international community. South 
Africa claimed its rejection of the NPT was born out of fears of exposing its uranium 
enrichment trade secrets to the outside world.84 Then, the furor over the 1974 Indian test 
of its alleged PNE indicated a shift in international norms.85   Assuming the true nature of 
South Africa’s nuclear program had been peaceful from the start, then the investment of 
resources would prove wasted as the world turned its back on PNEs. It also created 
organizational incentives to move forward with its nuclear program since human and 
resource capital were already in place.86   
The South African PNE program was a closely guarded secret. In 1974, a team of 
South African researchers successfully tested the design of a gun-type device, which 
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could be used for PNEs or nuclear weapons.87 That same year, South Africa began to dig 
two nuclear test shafts in the Kalahari Desert.88  In 1977, Soviet satellites discovered the 
Kalahari test site creating an international firestorm.89 This development combined with 
the rejection of the NPT put it at odds with the United States, which would pass the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Act in 1978 forbidding nuclear trade with non-NPT members.   
South Africa was willing to ignore the nuclear norms shifting around it because of 
their linkage to apartheid.90  Apartheid was non-negotiable. It would stay; therefore, there 
was nothing to be gained from nuclear policy reversal. In this light, Pretoria saw little 
benefit from joining the NPT. Because of apartheid, it would be sanctioned anyway, so 
why bother?91    
However, this period, especially after the Kalahari incident, is a missed 
opportunity to stop South African nuclear proliferation. The Nuclear Suppliers Group, 
formed in 1975 as a response to the Indian “peaceful” test, was designed to prevent the 
sale of sensitive nuclear technology to non-nuclear power. It could have been used 
orchestrate a comprehensive nuclear embargo that might have stripped South Africa of 
the ability to both fuel its reactors and enrich HEU. This would have forced to choose in a 
confirmable way. Shutting down the Safari 1 reactor would have been proof that Pretoria 
was choosing nuclear weapons.   At the very least it could have signaled to Pretoria that 
the West would not tolerate its nuclear weapons program.   
Instead, after a series of demarches and threats stemming for the Kalahari 
incident, the West, minus the U.S., backed away from a total nuclear embargo.92  South 
Africa was still able to benefit from outside support. South Africa was able to continue to 
invest in its already robust nuclear infrastructure and continued its collaborative 
                                                 
87 Purkitt and Burgess, South Africa's Weapons of Mass Destruction, 41. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Donald L. R. Goodson, “Catalytic Deterrence,” Politikon: South African Journal of Political 
Studies, Vol. 39, Issue 2 (August 2012), 210. 
90 Liberman, “The Rise and Fall of the South African Bomb,” 68–69. 
91 Ibid., 50. 
92 Ibid., 69–70. 
 30 
relationship with Israel, another non-NPT country.93 Sanctions provided more incentive 
for South Africa to master the nuclear fuel cycle and had already prompted the creation 
of an indigenous arms industry. The sanctions had also convinced South Africa that, 
minus some external prompt, they had been abandoned by the West and would face the 
communists alone. Against this backdrop, South Africa shifted its PNE program towards 
weaponization. 
4. Catalytic Nuclear Strategy 
Because of the insular, paranoid nature of decision-making, and the post-apartheid 
recalcitrance of many of those involved, there is not a consensus in the literature of the 
exact moment when the decision was made for South Africa to acquire nuclear weapons. 
Further, the actual utility of these nuclear weapons is clearly debatable. Former Minister 
of Defense and Prime Minster, P.W. Botha stated that the nuclear weapons were 
“diplomatic weapons,” but the strategy surrounding their utility was half-articulate at 
best.94 What is clear is that circumstances provided South African with the means, 
motives, and opportunity to proliferate. 
The decision to acquire a nuclear weapons capability can best be pinpointed to 
after the 1977 Kalahari episode. After the test-site was discovered, then Prime Minister 
Vorster ordered a cancelation of the PNE program and the test site was closed.95  Vorster 
then ordered that a secret nuclear deterrent capability be constructed. He turned to 
Minister of Defense P.W. Botha to develop the weapons. Botha then turned to the SADF 
chief of plans, Brigadier General John Huyser, to develop a study for how to move 
forward. Huyser’s study outlined three options for moving forward—secret development, 
covert disclosure, or overt disclosure.96 Huyser recommended the third option—South 
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Africa should openly become a nuclear power.97  Botha approved the document, but 
demurred from openly joining the nuclear club. 
In 1978, P.W. Botha became Prime Minister and moved forward with the nuclear 
program. He formed a secret planning group to administer the development of nuclear 
weapons and a “credible nuclear deterrent.”  Armscor, the indigenous weapons 
manufacturing company created in part as a response to UN arms embargoes, was given 
the task of developing the actual warheads themselves.98  By 1982, Armscor delivered 
the first nuclear bomb with an additional non-deliverable weapon available for testing 
purposes.99  By 1989, Armscor delivered six nuclear bombs, and had even gone as far to 
explore an ICBM deliverable weapon in conjunction with the Israelis.100  
The logic of South Africa’s “credible” nuclear deterrent was atypical of 
traditional nuclear calculus. South Africa was not faced with a nuclear rival on the 
continent, and it did not have the means with which to threaten the Soviet Union, which 
was backing its enemies. A nuclear strike against Soviet or Cuban forces operating in 
Africa could have led to annihilation.   South Africa’s security situation was deteriorating 
but manageable in the mid-1970s when it made the decision to go nuclear.101  Isolation 
and deepening Soviet and Cuban involvement in Africa degraded South Africa’s 
situation, and Pretoria became worried about military defeat, which further drove its 
nuclear acquisition. However, South Africa was largely isolated from the Cold War, and 
therefore, did not understand the limitations in Soviet military capabilities or its policy 
goals.102 There was little chance of an actual Soviet invasions, and the SADF was more 
than capable of defeating a Cuban incursion into South African proper.103  Further, the 
SADF was left out of much of the nuclear decision-making and did not have a doctrine 
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for the employment of nuclear weapons in a battlefield scenario.104  There is evidence of 
military reluctance over the nuclear program because it consumed resources that could 
have otherwise been used for acquisition of more usable conventional assets.105 The 
SADF may have accidentally created the  oversold the communist “Total Onslaught” 
threat in order to guarantee funding.106 As defense budgets shrank in the twilight of the 
apartheid era, the SADF was willing to give up nuclear weapons that were cutting into 
conventional spending.107   
Military utility was not the main purpose of South Africa’s nuclear weapons. The 
logic of South Africa’s credible nuclear deterrent appears to have existed almost 
completely within P.W. Botha and his inner circle. In 1978, Botha adopted a three phase 
catalytic nuclear strategy that would be implemented in South Africa faced an existential 
threat.108 The first phase would be one of strategic ambiguity where South Africa 
maintained opacity regarding its nuclear capacity. The second phase would be a quiet 
revelation to once friendly governments like Great Britain and the United States. If this 
quiet revelation did not prompt these powers to intervene, the third phase would be 
implemented where South Africa would publicly declare its nuclear capability with a 
nuclear test as an optional additional measure. Therefore, South Africa’s nuclear 
deterrence was completely unique and non-traditional.109 It was not designed to prevent 
action, but to compel it—namely a Western intervention on its behalf.110   
Botha believed in the utility of this logic. In 1986 or 1987 the Kalahari test site 
was covertly re-opened to be ready for a nuclear test as required.111 Botha was quoted as 
saying “if we set this thing off, the Yanks will come running.”112 The reasoning, in part, 
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was informed by South Africa’s perception of Israel’s behavior in the 1973 Yom Kippur 
War. The South Africans believed that Israeli moves towards nuclearization of the 
conflict promoted U.S. assistance.113  The more troubling aspect of this strategy is its 
lack of a fourth phase. If the other phases failed, would this force South Africa to use a 
nuclear weapon?  This fact prompted South African collaboration with Israel on an 
ICBM.114  Taken to its logical conclusion, South Africa’s catalytic strategy would have 
been to compel Western intervention or risk general nuclear war. It is doubtful that South 
Africa could have developed a ICBM capability on par with Cold War numbers or that 
Botha was all that interested in developing a fourth phase to the strategy. He rejected 
Armcor’s proposals to develop more advanced warheads because they would “never” be 
used offensively therefore the expense wasn’t worth it.115  Whether or not the Pretoria’s 
nuclear weapons would be used in angry in unknowable; however, the idea of a micro-
deterrent strategy with a few nuclear warheads aimed at a superpower is chilling to 
contemplate.   
The late apartheid period led to a quick end to the South African nuclear weapons 
program. In 1989, newly elected Prime Minister F.W. de Klerk ordered a review of 
military spending with an eye towards drastically cutting the defense budget and freeing 
up money for reform programs. As Pretoria began to shift away from apartheid, the U.S. 
government, having long suspect South Africa of proliferating, began pressuring de Klerk 
to dismantle the nuclear program lest it fall to the ANC, which at the time was still 
suspect.116  De Klerk saw the NPT as a way of normalizing relations with the word and 
in 1990, he ordered  that the nuclear program and its supporting infrastructure be 
dismantled.   
The actions surrounding getting rid of the nuclear weapons were surprisingly 
mundane. The drive to acquire the weapons had almost solely rested with Botha, and now 
that he was out of office the weapons had few advocates. The military was not heavily 
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invested in the program and had no nuclear warfighting doctrine or plans. The SADF 
Buccaneer bomber, which was the only system capable of delivering the nuclear bombs, 
ended its service life in 1990 so, even if South Africa had retained its weapons, it would 
not have the means to deliver them.117  Therefore, getting rid of the weapons would not 
create a gap in capability, and the SADF wanted to spend money elsewhere. Further, 
none of the players wanted the weapons in the hands of the ANC. In effect, South Africa 
had nothing to lose by giving up its nuclear weapons but much to gain.   
With the military onboard and under strict government supervision, the nuclear 
weapons were disassembled and the HEU recast for fuel. The Kalahari test shafts were 
permanently sealed, and the documentation of the nuclear weapons program 
destroyed.118  South Africa acceded to the NPT in 1991, and by 1992, the dismantlement 
process was complete. In 1993, de Klerk went public with the nuclear programs, and by 
1994 the IEA confirmed that all of the nuclear weapons had been dismantled.119 South 
Africa’s CB programs were also dismantled in a similar fashion. The world’s first case of 
unilateral nuclear disarmament was success, but it was not necessarily a success of the 
nonproliferation regime. 
5. Implication and Conclusions 
The world felt good about punishing apartheid. The sanctions against South 
Africa satisfied domestic audiences in sender countries and created the perception of 
doing something. However, South Africa was able to endure the sanctions, and it was not 
until the divestiture campaign stripped it of financial access did economic coercion really 
begin to work.120  The sanctions against South Africa were not successful by themselves 
because several factors listed in the ESR study were present.   
First, the sanctions created their own antidotes. This is especially true with the 
arms embargo. South Africa was able to create a domestic arms industry sophisticated 
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enough to produce nuclear weapons. Secondly, South Africa had several “black knights” 
that were will to continue to work with the apartheid regime. Finally, the sanctions 
against South Africa risk alienating certain domestic audiences in the sender countries, 
especially with the energy and financial sectors. The grassroots divestiture campaign 
made the cost of doing business with South Africa high enough to choke South Africa’s 
economy, but absent this campaign, the apartheid regime might have been able to hold on 
longer.  
Economic coercion also had nothing to do with the improved security situation. 
South African leaders were able to reform because they no longer threatened from the 
outside. However, the reverse might a have been true as well, a harder hitting sanctions 
regime could have force South Africa to reform in order to be able to continue to defend 
itself against external threats. The slow, haphazard nature of the sanctions allowed South 
Africa to evade and even thrive for a period. Had the sanctions been quick and 
comprehensive, especially given South Africa’s vulnerability in energy and finance, they 
might have forced a resolution faster. Instead, the sanctions created incentives for South 
Africa to proliferate WMD while doing little to target the means.   
Shortly after the transition from apartheid Nelson Mandela appealed to the world 
that the sanctions be quickly lifted, which for the most part they were. But outside powers 
like the U.S. and UK still needed proof that South Africa’s WMD programs were gone. 
This required confidence building measures. In the case of South Africa, Mandela was a 
revered and popular leader on the world stage. With apartheid defeated, the world could 
agree to end sanctions quickly. But, had de Klerk not ordered unilateral WMD 
disarmament and post-apartheid South African been “born” WMD-capable, would the 
case been the same?  Would Mandela have retained as much global popularity if he had 
retained South Africa’s WMD? This counterfactual is unanswerable, but it raises 
questions for future policy as WMD armed states make transitions. 
Finally, regarding sanctions as a specific tool for fighting WMD proliferation, 
South Africa is a troubling case that illustrates the difficulty of coercing state behavior. 
The UN sponsored sanctions and arm embargos were targeting at ending apartheid and 
South African occupation of Namibia. These efforts created the incentive to proliferate 
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while failing to take concrete steps to stop it even when the risks of nuclear proliferation 
were clear after the discovery of the Kalahari test site. The U.S. CAA prevented the U.S. 
from selling nuclear materials to South Africa, but did nothing to punish others who did.    
Further, South African nuclear proliferation illustrates several flaws with the 
nuclear nonproliferation regime. Foremost, the promotion of nuclear power came before 
the NPT and was enshrined within it. South Africa was able to exploit the dual use 
paradox. It developed a domestic nuclear capability before deciding to develop nuclear 
weapons, and started its programs before the advent of nonproliferation measures like the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group, which wasn’t formed until 1975. The successful evasion of the 
arm embargo that created a sophisticated domestic industry combined with access to 
nuclear technology and uranium made South Africa resilient sanctions targeted at nuclear 
weapons programs. Assuming that South African willingness to bear the costs of nuclear 
acquisition no matter how high and given that it had domestic access to uranium and had 
mastered the fuel cycle, there was little the NPR could have done to stop South Africa 
from acquiring nuclear weapons. However, the rapid dismantlement of South Africa’s 
nuclear program and lack on internal resistance to the dismantlement, indicate that there 
was not a large demand for nuclear weapons beyond Botha and his inner circle. 
Therefore, economic coercion might have prevented proliferation had it been better 
executed. Just as they might have ended apartheid more quickly,  smart sanctions that 
targeted South Africa’s access to financial markets, energy, and access to nuclear 
materials and technology could have forced Pretoria to give up its nuclear programs by 
raising the cost of proliferation to unacceptable levels. South Africa was able to exploit a 
lag in the establishment of the global nonproliferation regime, but it was still vulnerable. 
It did not have enough capacity to supply fuel to both its nuclear power and weapons 
programs, and it needed conventional military capability to fight the brush fire wars. 
Smart sanctions would have strangled the SADF as well. 
Beyond speculation of how sanctions might have ended apartheid and 
proliferation sooner, they did have one notable use in providing the incentive for South 
African to demonstrate its willingness to return to international norms. If apartheid had to 
end to save South Africa, WMD disarmament and compliance with the NPT, BWC, and 
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CWC were good confidences building measures during the transition. In this case, 
sanctions and the NPR were useful tools and speeding the transition away from apartheid.  
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III. MUAMMAR’S WHITE ELEPHANT 
Libya is an oil-rich country that resides in a relatively stable area of North Africa 
with a close geographical proximity to European markets. Home to some of the world’s 
best oil reserves, Libya is a nation that should have fully reaped the benefits of its 
geography and natural resources. Instead, the course of the last forty years has left Libya 
economically backwards, isolated, and wracked by civil war and unrest. Libya’s woes 
stem from the decision making of one man--the late Colonel Muammar Gaddafi who’s 
military adventurism, support for terrorism, and attempts at WMD proliferation led to a 
lengthy sanctions campaign against Libya. Gaddafi took power in a military coup, led 
Libya into pariah status, and then led it back into some degree of normalcy until he was 
killed by Libyan rebels in 2011. Economic coercion played a large role in forcing 
Gaddafi to reverse his policies, including the pursuit of WMD, and there is evidence that 
Libya’s proliferation could have ended quicker had the West been more open to 
negotiation. Additionally, changes to the international political climate played a 
significant role in Libya’s reversal, and unlike South Africa successful nuclear 
proliferation, Libya never achieved fruition with its WMD programs beyond a basic 
chemical arsenal. In effect, WMD became a white elephant that cost Libya more that it 
could possibly hope to gain. Gaddafi was able to sell his white elephant for a fair price—
the complete lifting of sanctions and diplomatic reintegration.121  
A. THE COLONEL’S SECRET RECIPE FOR DISASTER 
From almost its first moments, the regime of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi was on a 
collision course with the rest of the West. Gaddafi was an officer in the Libyan military 
and steeped in the Nasserite Pan Arab movement of the time. Humiliated by the Arab 
performance against Israel during the 1967 “Six Day War” and longing for Arab unity to 
oppose Israel, Gadaffi, along with a group of fellow officers, deposed the Libyan royal 
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family in a bloodless coup in 1969 and assumed the role of head of state. He immediately 
adopted a strident anti-Western and anti-Israeli tone and expelled British and U.S. air 
force personnel from bases within Libya. Gaddafi began to govern his country with a of 
brand socialism espoused in his famous “Green Book.”  Gaddafi structured the Libyan 
economy on a state command model that became riddled with corruption and 
inefficiency. Gaddafi’s proliferation ambitions began almost immediately, and he 
reportedly sought to purchase a nuclear weapon from China in 1970.122  Later, he 
reportedly attempted to purchase one again, but this time from India in 1978.123  
Despite, the expulsion of Air Force personnel, the Nixon Administration initially 
adopted a “wait and see” approach to Gaddafi thinking that he might be a useful tool to 
fight communism in North Africa.124  However, relations with the U.S. soon degraded as 
Gaddafi nationalized Libya’s oil fields and began to oppose the U.S. role in brokering 
peace between the Arabs and Israelis.   Gaddafi’s Libya soon began behaving like other 
“revolutionary states” of the time. Gaddafi’s philosophical leanings prompted him to 
support terrorist organizations fighting against whom he perceived as his enemies.125  
Gaddafi’s behavior led to what can be characterized as three phases of sanctions. 
The first was largely comprised of U.S. unilateral sanctions that began in 1978. This 
period lasted until 1992 when the UN imposed multilateral sanctions because of Libya’s 
involvement in the bombings of two passenger airliners. The multilateral sanctions lasted 
until 1999 when the UN suspended them after the extradition of the Libyan intelligence 
officers responsible for the bombings. The third phase of sanctions was the continuation 
of ongoing U.S. unilateral sanctions that lasted from 1999 to 2004. The ESR Libya case 
study concludes that both the unilateral and multilateral sanctions campaigns were a 
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complete success with all sender goals met.126  It assesses that sanctions significantly 
contributed in forcing Libya to comply with sender goals.127  The three phases will be 
discussed in more detail below. 
B. U.S. UNILATERAL SANCTIONS PART 1 (1978–1992) 
Because of terrorist support and the beginnings of Libyan military adventurism in 
Chad, the U.S. began unilateral sanctions in 1978, that starting with an arms embargo. 
This soon expanded to a set of congressionally mandated export controls.128 In 1981, the 
U.S. closed the Libyan diplomatic mission in Washington DC. This was soon followed 
by the Gulf of Sidra incident where U.S. aircraft, operating in international waters that 
Libya claimed as its own and responding to Libyan provocation, shot down two Libyan 
Air Force fighters.   
Relations between the United States and Libya spiraled downward from there. 
The U.S. began an embargo of the Libyan aviation industry and ordered all U.S. citizens 
to leave Libya.129  The U.S. embargoes quickly expanded to oil field equipment and 
President Reagan placed a restriction on the import of Libyan crude oil products.130  The 
U.S. expanded the oil embargo in 1985 to cover all petroleum products, and in 1986, 
President Reagan ordered a complete trade ban with Libya. That same year, a bomb 
exploded in a West Berlin disco frequented by U.S. service members killing three and 
wounding 150.   In retaliation, President Reagan ordered the bombing of Libya, and later 
the U.S. orchestrated the G7 industrial countries agreement to ban sales of arms to 
countries involved in terrorism, especially Libya.131  The bombings killed one of 
Gaddafi’s adopted daughters, but did change his misbehavior. 
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Although it was not evident at the time, the next step in the U.S. unilateral 
sanctions campaign probably did the most long-term damage to the Libyan economy. In 
1986, the U.S. Treasury Department forced all U.S. oil companies still operating in Libya 
to leave.132 In effect, combined with the ban of oil field equipment sales, this action left 
the Libyan petroleum industry frozen in time for the better part of two decades. Libya 
was able to find other sources for some petroleum equipment, but the U.S. sanctions, 
combined with Gaddafi’s erratic behavior, made Libya an unattractive place for outsiders 
to invest. Libya lacked the expertise to develop its oil fields on its own, and the oil 
industry stagnated.133  Libya could sell the oil it could already produce, but it could not 
expand its market share. Libya was stuck with a fixed income that Gaddafi chose to 
spend poorly. 
Beyond hobbling Libya’s long-term prospects for economic growth, the period of 
U.S. unilateral sanctions did little to alter Libya’s behavior. Whatever oil trade was lost 
with the U.S. was made up for by other regions. In 1980, the U.S. accounted for 35% of 
all Libyan exports, mainly oil.134  By 1987, Europe had absorbed most of this market.135 
Libya was able to import goods it could no longer get from the U.S., minus many oil and 
aviation items, from other venues. The weapons embargo did little to affect Libya as it 
found a ready “black knight” with the Soviet Union. From 1979–1983, Libya purchased 
more than $12 billion in military equipment from the Soviet bloc.136  These weapons 
were used in Libya’s military interventions in Chad, and Gaddafi’s terrorist support 
continued unfettered. During this period Libya began its path to proliferation, and 
acquired a nuclear research reactor from the Soviets.137 The U.S. sanctions did little to 
stem the flow of money, arms, and nuclear technology into Libya. 
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However, three events were about to put Libya on a collision course with the UN. 
The first was the collapse of the Soviet Union. This resulted in Libya losing geopolitical 
top cover in the UN and its main supplier of armaments. The newly formed Russian 
Federation inherited Libya’s weapons sales debt from the USSR that Gaddafi would soon 
be unable to service, hardly the foundation for a continued collaborative relationship.138   
The U.S. was able to cajole other countries into not selling arms to Libya and weapons 
imports virtually ceased.139 The second was the move of Arab states to begin to accept 
Israel as a permanent entity, putting Gaddafi at odds with the rest of the Arab world.140  
The final factor was Gaddafi’s complete overreach in support to terrorism. Up to this 
point, the world had been willing to tolerate Gaddafi’s misdeeds, but all of this changed 
in 1988 when Pan Am Flight 103 exploded over Lockerbie Scotland.   
C. UN MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS (1992–1999) 
Libyan operatives were directly involved in the bombings of Pan Am Flight 103 
and later in the 1989 Bombing of French Union des Transports Aériens (UTA) Flight 772 
that exploded over Niger. Gaddafi’s transgressions now took center stage in global 
affairs. In 1991, the UK, France, and the U.S. identified several Libyan intelligence 
officials who collaborated in both bombings and demanded their extradition. Libya 
arrested two men implicated in the bombings, but failed to extradite them. The UK began 
calls in the UN for sanctions against Libya, and Libya responded by offering to turn over 
the bombing suspects to an international tribunal. The UN rejected this offer, and in 
1992, passed UNSCR 748 that imposed a total air and arms embargo.   
As the case continued, the UNSC voted to ban the sale of petroleum equipment to 
Libya but fell short of U.S. calls for a total embargo of Libyan crude oil. Europe now 
imported a good bit of its oil from Libya and was only willing to sacrifice so much to 
punish Gaddafi. U.S. calls for tougher sanctions were resisted because many saw this 
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strictly as an issue amoung the U.S., UK, France, and Libya.141  In effect, the U.S. 
unilateral sanctions against Libya, which caused Europe to absorb the oil that the U.S. 
had once bought, created its own partial antidote mitigating some of the sting from 
multilateral sanctions. 
During this period, the U.S. also passed a series of tougher laws aimed at 
punishing Libya.142  Libya was still able to export oil, and the sanctions had a modest, 
but not crippling, impact resulting in $18 billion in total losses directly attributable to the 
sanctions.143 However, the ignored calls for wider, tougher sanctions did have one 
positive effect. By staying narrow, they did not trigger a humanitarian, and therefore, 
proved sustainable.144   
The UN also imposed a series of financial sanctions that Libya was able to avoid 
in the short term because the implementation was slow.145  This is a case where the ESR 
study’s recommendation to slam the hammer, not turn the screw, proved relevant. These 
financial sanctions were only able to tie up under a billion dollars in Libyan assets.146  
However, the financial sanctions did further impede Libya’s ability to secure long-term 
credit.147  Libya also stockpiled foreign currency reserves out of uncertainty over how far 
the sanctions would go.148  Combined with the inability to access credit, these factors 
prevented Libya from making long-term developmental investments especially with 
exploitation and exploration of its oil reserves.149  
 Fluctuations in oil prices during the late 1990s also hurt Libya’s oil-dependent 
economy, leaving it further weakened economically. Gaddafi had been able to use oil to 
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buy off large segments of the population in a political economic system rife with 
corruption and cronyism.150  However, because it was dependent on the single 
commodity of oil that it could not fully exploit, Gaddafi was vulnerable.151  The effect of 
the sanctions combined with the drop in oil revenues forced the dictator to begin 
economic reforms in the late 1990s. Libya opened its economy along the lines of the 
Chinese model—economic liberalization could occur as long as the regime retained 
political control.152   
These reforms were illustrative of the impact that sanctions and economic 
mismanagement were having on Libyan internal politics. Gaddafi’s economic policies 
and failed foreign adventures created turbulence in the Libyan population. Gaddafi 
implemented a series of crackdowns on Islamist parties that had risen, in part, due to 
economic hardship. The sanctions hastened a domestic political crisis and forced Gaddafi 
to adjust both internal and external regime behavior.153  Yet, internal politics also 
hampered Gaddafi’s ability to get out from under the sanctions. The accused terrorists 
were from powerful families, and hints that Gaddafi might extradite them led to an 
attempted military coup in 1993.154  Gaddafi crushed the coup, but was forced to deal 
with the factors dragging his country down. In 1999, Gaddafi handed the Lockerbie 
bombers to The Hague for trial. 
D. U.S. UNILATERAL SANCTIONS PART 2 (1999–2004) 
Starting in 1999, the UN suspended but did not lift the sanctions against Libya. 
The suspension of the sanctions corresponded with rising oil prices and Libya saw an 
uptick in its GDP to $33.9 billion from its low point of $25.5 billion in 1995 at the height 
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of the multilateral sanctions period.155  At this point, UN and U.S. policy goals regarding 
Libya began to clash. The UN’s goals had been narrowly focused on the terrorism issue, 
but the U.S. also wanted to diminish Libya military capacity, especially its suspected 
WMD programs.156 During the multilateral sanctions period, the U.S. had implemented 
restrictions on companies that sold dual use technology to Libya, and had orchestrated the 
1996 formation of the Wassenaar Arrangement to restrict the sales of dual-use technology 
to countries like Libya.157 These measures remained in place. By that time, Libyan 
military capacity was already diminished. Military equipment imports had all but ceased. 
However, the question of WMD remained, and Libya was still actively seeking chemical 
and nuclear weapons.   
The UN sanctions, combined with continued U.S. efforts, created a 
“magnification effect” that still existed after the multilateral period.158 Libya was still 
seen as a risky place to do business. Short-term capital flowed into the country, but long-
term investment and development were still problematic. Libya was living paycheck to 
paycheck. Gaddafi was looking for a way out and approached the Clinton administration 
in the late 1990s.159 He reportedly placed his WMD on the negotiating table as part of 
this attempted opening.160  This set the groundwork for a series of negotiations that 
concluded in 2003, which resulted in Libya publicly giving up its WMD and the final 
lifting of U.S. sanctions in 2004. By 2008, Libya had increased its GDP from $25.75 in 
2004 billion to $93.2 billion.161  This period also corresponded with an increase in global 
oil sales, especially to the emerging Chinese market, and Libya was now able to develop 
its oil infrastructure to start to meet this demand.   
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E. LIBYA’S SECURITY SITUATION: A SELF-IMPOSED MESS 
The late Colonel Gaddafi had no real threats to its external security beyond those 
that Gaddafi’s actions created. Libya had no regional rival to prompt its proliferation and 
was never seriously threatened by an outside power.162  Instead of structuring his military 
around existing threats, Gaddafi engaged in military adventures that made his country 
appear reckless and aggressive. Libyan troops engaged in two border clashes with Egypt, 
and Gaddafi even sent a small contingent of troops to fight in Lebanon in the 1980s. He 
continuously meddled in the affairs of his neighbors, which steadily diminished his 
standing in the Arab and Muslim world. 
The most notable of these adventures was a series of interventions in Libya’s 
neighbor to the south, the beleaguered Republic of Chad. A former French Colony, Chad 
engaged in a series of civil wars that lasted throughout from the mid-1960s through the 
early 1980s. In the late 1970s, Gaddafi intervened and began a series of interventions in 
Chad’s taking sides his neighbor’s internal disputes to further his own goals. Gaddafi’s 
interests included the possible annexation of part or all of Chad into Libya or at the very 
least creating a Libyan client state.163 He also was interested in supporting ethnic Arabs 
and Muslim coreligionists.164  
 In 1973, Libya seized a mineral rich portion of northern Chad known as the 
Aouzou Strip..165  This area reportedly has large deposits of natural uranium although 
there is no indication that Gaddafi ever made an effort to extract the uranium in support 
of his nuclear programs. By 1983, Libyan had spent $4.2 billion in arms, or 26.6% of the 
government’s budget, on the military, in large part to fortify his hold over the occupied 
Aouzou Strip.166  A series offensives and counter-offensive involving support from the 
U.S., France, and the USSR evolved throughout the 1970s and 1980s until Algeria finally 
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brokered a peace deal between the two nations, but Libya remained in the . Aouzou Strip. 
In 1990, the two sides in submitted the matter to International Court of Justice, which 
ruled in favor of Chad. The UN monitored the withdrawal of Libyan forces that was 
completed in 1994.167  Gaddafi had spent billions with nothing to show for it beyond 
making his regime appear reckless and aggressive, putting him further at odds with the 
West. Further, if Gaddafi’s goals were to exploit the uranium in the Aouzou strip, then 
sanctions played a role in inhibiting this. Gaddafi was choked from the capital required 
for long-term development projects like uranium mining and processing. In the end, 
Libya spent its money holding onto a resource it could not use. 
Beyond military adventurism, Gaddafi engaged in international intrigue as well. 
He openly supported movements like the Palestinian Liberation Organization, the Red 
Brigades, and Irish Republican Army. Libyan supported organizations were implicated in 
a series of terrorist acts that increasingly put it at odds with the West. Libyan backed 
terrorist groups conducted a series of attacks in Europe targeting several countries. In 
1986, three Libyan intelligence officers conducted a bombing in a Berlin Disco that killed 
two U.S. service members, and Ronald Reagan ordered a bombing raid on Libya in 
retaliation. The U.S. also reportedly supported Libyan opposition movements that had the 
goal of overthrowing the Gaddafi regime. In short order, Gaddafi faced military strikes, 
sanctions, and covert actions because of the positions he adopted and actions his 
government carried out.   
The global political climate began to shift away from Gaddafi. His anti-colonial 
message lost power as the post-colonial period ended. The Arab world began to 
normalize relations with Israel and pan-Arabism died. The Soviet Union collapsed, 
evaporating whatever usefulness Gaddafi might have had as a Cold War foil in North 
Africa. European revolutionary terrorist groups like the Red Army Faction faded into 
oblivion. The multilateral sanctions period saw Gaddafi’s Libya being punished for 
participating in a conflict that no longer existed. Ultimately, Gaddafi took responsibility 
for his terrorist actions and shifted his attention to Africa, where his oil money was able 
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to purchase higher standing. He extradited the Lockerbie bombers to Scotland and paid 
restitution for other actions. The multilateral sanctions were suspended, but during this 
period, Gaddafi had adopted another course that kept him at odds with the West—the 
proliferation of WMD. 
F. THE WHITE ELEPHANT 
From almost the beginning of his regime, Gaddafi sought a nuclear capability. He 
viewed this as an Arab obligation to counter the undeclared Israeli nuclear arsenal.168 
Beyond attempt to purchase nuclear weapons, Libya also embarked on a program to 
develop its own nuclear capability. Libya sought to enter into nuclear collaboration 
arrangements with various other countries, and finally in 1981, the Soviets built a small 
research reactor for the Libyans.169 In this sense, Libya followed a similar proliferation 
pattern as other countries. They were supplied with nuclear technology for outwardly 
peaceful purposes that ended up creating a dual-use dilemma.  
Like other proliferators, Libya kept up the appearance of adhering to international 
norms. In 1971 Libya became a party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of 
chemical and biological weapons in war.170  Libya signed the BWC in 1982 and ratified 
the NPT in 1975 that had been signed by the deposed king.171  Along with other Arab 
nations, Libya refused to sign the CWC to protest Israel’s failure to sign the NPT.172 
Libya also supported the 1996 African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty.173 Libya also 
placed Soviet supplied research reactor that came online in 1983 under IAEA 
safeguards.174   
Beyond outward appearances, however, Libya began work on acquiring the 
means to produce nuclear weapons in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Libya was 
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scientifically backwards and did not have a readily available supply of uranium so it had 
to rely on foreign sources for both technological support and fuel.175  From 1978 to 1991, 
Libya imported more than 2,263 metric tons of yellowcake uranium.176 Libyan scientists 
also began small-scale work on converting yellowcake into uranium hexafluoride for use 
in centrifuge isotope separation in the early 1980s.177  These experiments apparently 
ended in 1989 but resumed for a period in 1994 when Gaddafi sought to reinvigorate his 
nuclear programs.178 The Libyans ordered a uranium hexafluoride production facility 
from a foreign vendor, but it never went into operation because key components of the 
facility were never received.179  Beyond receiving small batches of uranium hexafluoride 
for experiments, Libya was never able to mount a large-scale uranium gaseous diffusion 
effort, a key step in enriching uranium for bombs or for use as nuclear reactor fuel to 
create plutonium.180  Additionally, Libya reportedly never received the required 
fabrication equipment to make fuel for reactors.181  
Libya also acquired centrifuge technology from foreign sources, including the 
notorious AQ Khan network in Pakistan, and experimented with building centrifuge 
enrichment cascades. However, the largest cascade Libyan scientists managed to 
construct was composed of nine centrifuges. 182 It takes hundreds, if not thousands of 
centrifuges, linked together to enrich uranium on an industrial scale. Libyan scientists 
also received training in enrichment techniques from foreign sources, and collaborated 
with North Korea in uranium gaseous diffusion technology.183  In 2003, a ship loaded 
with enrichment equipment manufactured in Malaysia by the AQ Khan network was 
seized under the auspices of the U.S. sponsored Proliferation Security Initiative. Even if 
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Libya had ever been able to produce uranium hexafluoride on the required scale, it now 
no longer had the centrifuges required to enrich it.  
Apart from its nascent efforts at enriching uranium, Libya managed to acquire an 
outdated Chinese nuclear warhead design from the AQ Khan network for the reported 
price of $50 million.184  However, there is little evidence that Libya acted to turn these 
designs into an actual weapon. Libyan nuclear scientists did not collaborate with its 
missile scientists or create any facilities devoted to developing and testing nuclear 
weapon components.185 Libya’s ability to deliver a warhead that it had yet to build was 
also problematic. Its missile arsenal consisted mostly of short range SCUD-Bs with a 
175-lb payload and a few North Korean SCUD-Cs with a 1500-lb payload.186  By 
comparison, the U.S. “Little Boy” atom bomb, the type Libya could most easily develop 
with the technology it sought, weighed 9,700 lbs. The Libyan’s were developing a bigger 
indigenous missile, but this project was hampered by the sanctions regime against it. 187 
Therefore, even if the technologically backwards Libyans had been able to build a bomb, 
they did not possess a missile to deliver it without first managing to make a very 
advanced lightweight warhead. The Libyan’s did operate a few Soviet made T-22 
bombers capable of carrying a 20,000-lb payload, which could have been used to deliver 
nuclear bombs, but there is no evidence the Libyan Air Force took steps to make these 
bombers nuclear capable.     
The best way to describe Libya’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons is that it 
dabbled in proliferation. In 2004, then Libyan Foreign Minister Rahman Shalgam seemed 
to confirm this when he stated, “We had the equipment; we had the material and the 
know-how and the scientists. But we never decided to produce such weapons. To have 
flour, water and fire does not mean that you have bread.”188  How able the Libyans were 
to cook their nuclear “bread” is debatable, but the nuclear efforts never looked very 
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serious, especially when compared with countries like South Africa and Iraq. Libya was 
able to achieve some success in acquiring chemical weapons and manufactured 23 metric 
tons of mustard agent and approximately 3,000 chemical warheads.189 Again, when 
compared to the 760 tons of chemical weapons including the highly complex agent VX 
that UN inspectors destroyed in Iraq after the Gulf War, Libya’s proliferation efforts look 
meager.190  
G. MUAMMAR’S BARGAIN AND THE IMPACT OF SANCTIONS 
Sanctions didn’t stop Gaddafi from proliferating, but they did, when combined 
with fluctuations in oil prices and changes in Libya’s place on the world’s stage, 
influence his decision to give up his WMD. As stated in the literature review, there are 
two competing narratives regarding Gaddafi’s decision to reverse his proliferation. The 
first, as advocated by the Bush administration, was the “pedagogic” value of the Iraq 
War. The logic of this argument is that dictators with WMD were put on notice that their 
violations would not be tolerated, and Gaddafi blinked. In light of the WMD debacle in 
Iraq and the subsequent lingering insurgency, the Bush administration was clearly 
looking for good news. A Libyan proliferation reversal by way of Baghdad neatly fit the 
Bush administration’s narrative.  
The competing narrative is that sanctions and diplomacy provided the incentive 
for Gaddafi to come in from the cold. This narrative adheres closer to the facts. Sanctions 
left Libya isolated and stunted. The multilateral sanctions against Gaddafi actually 
worked very quickly because shortly after they were imposed, he offered up the 
suspected terrorists to an international tribunal. The Western senders rejected this, but 
seven years later, the extradition deal that was worked out was very similar to what 
Gaddafi had originally offered.191  The final unilateral phase of U.S. sanctions still had 
an impact, and Gaddafi was looking for a way out from under them. Further, Gaddafi had 
                                                 
189 Cirincione et al., Deadly Arsenals, 324. 
190 Ibid., 343. 
191 Cortright and Lopez, The Sanctions Decade, 199. 
 53 
quietly offered to give up his WMD during the Clinton Administration; however, this 
offer was entangled in the Lockerbie affair. The deal was never negotiated further.192   
The events of September 11, 2001, presented Gaddafi an opportunity to realign 
with the West.193  He had internal struggles with Islamist organizations within his own 
borders, and saw that he now had a common enemy with the U.S.. Gaddafi was a Muslim 
but not necessarily an Islamic fundamentalist. His government was secular—officially a 
socialist vice Islamic republic.194   He quickly renounced the attacks and Al Qaeda, and 
he began a collaborative intelligence relationship with the West.195 After the end of 
multilateral sanctions, U.S. analysts concluded that Gaddafi had curtailed his support to 
international terrorism, but the U.S. still officially label Libya as a state sponsor of 
terror.196  Denouncing and collaborating against al Qaeda made an improved Libyan 
relationship with the U.S. feasible, but WMD remained a key issue with Western policy 
makers.   
To that end, the U.S. and UK began a series of secret negotiations with Gaddafi 
which lasted from 2001 to 2003. Economic sanctions played a key role in these 
negotiations.197 U.S. sanctions remained and the UN sanctions had been suspended but 
not lifted. If the WMD issue could be resolved, the sanctions from all senders might be 
lifted for good. Gaddafi desired to once again be a player on the international stage and 
greatly desired an end to his nation’s isolation and economic stagnation.198 The U.S. 
quietly offered the dictator a security guarantee, and the deal was struck.199  The U.S. 
began to lift sanctions, and the UN permanently lifted its own. The Libyan economy 
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surged, resulting in $66.1 billion in exports during 2008, a figure almost ten times 1998’s 
total of $6.8 billion.200  
The end to Libya’s WMD programs was quick and un-dramatic. Teams of 
inspectors from U.S. and UK agencies along with the IAEA and OPCW descended on 
Libya. U.S. and British officials immediately removed the most sensitive components of 
the WMD programs including the nuclear weapons designs acquired from AQ Khan.201 
After this, the long process of dismantling Libya’s nuclear infrastructure and proliferation 
network began. Libya declared its chemical stockpiles to the OPCW, which led the 
destruction effort. Libya then sought approval to convert its chemical weapons 
production facility to a pharmaceutical plant.202  
Gaddafi’s WMD dabbling was soon over. 
H. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS: THE CARROT AND STICK 
WORKS 
Both Western and international officials were amazed at the level of cooperation 
from Libya. Like South Africa, it went from a WMD pariah to a paragon in short order. 
And like South Africa, sanctions played a role but were not necessarily decisive in 
forcing Libya to change course. Gaddafi’s shifts in interests and the global geopolitical 
shift towards the U.S. at the end of the Cold War played a role as well. Notably, 
multilateral sanctions, when applied, worked quickly against Libya. Gaddafi was eager to 
deal with the senders who, in turn, did not at first accept his terms. Further, during the 
multilateral sanctions period, shrewder diplomacy could have done more to end 
Gaddafi’s proliferation while concurrently ending his support of terrorism. It was a 
missed opportunity that the Clinton administration could have exploited had it been able 
to bear the political cost.   
In this way, the Libya case presents several implications for policy makers. The 
first is the unsavory nature of diplomatic dealings with dictators and rogue regimes. The 
                                                 
200 Ibid., 92. 
201 Bahgat, The Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East, 126. 
202 Cirincione et al., Deadly Arsenals, 324. 
 55 
costs of negotiating with Gaddafi may have been too high for the already wounded 
Clinton administration. Keeping U.S. sanctions against Libya in place was politically 
more expedient than going before an already antagonistic Congress and asking for the 
lifting of U.S. laws prohibiting trade with Libya. Additionally, there was no demand from 
the international community for the U.S. to lift the sanctions. There was no lingering 
humanitarian crisis like the one unfolding in Iraq at the same time to prompt the world to 
demand action. 
Further, negotiating with Gaddafi was politically risky it itself. He had already 
demonstrated himself untrustworthy in the West’s eyes. The narrow focus of the 
multilateral sanctions period to the extradition of terrorists meant that compliance was 
easily verifiable despite the climate of mistrust. The suspension vice lifting of the 
multilateral sanctions meant that further Libyan misbehavior could be quickly punished. 
The WMD issue presented a thornier problem for negotiations. When the deal was finally 
struck, the rigorous inspection and verification efforts demonstrated a good model of 
working with disagreeable regimes. However, all this hinged on Gaddafi’s openness and 
willingness to cooperate. In this sense, Libya also presents a good example of delinking 
regime change with other issues like WMD. The security guarantee extended to Gaddafi 
facilitated both sides negotiating in good faith. Gaddafi could feel that he was not giving 
up his one trump card against the threat of the U.S. Marines returning to the shores of 
Tripoli. In this sense, Bush was able to do something politically that Clinton couldn’t. 
After toppling the Taliban and invading Iraq, no one could assail Bush politically for 
being soft on terror or rogue states. But the “pedagogic” lesson of the Iraq invasion was 
better suited for U.S. domestic political audiences.  
Another implication for policy makers is one that is beyond the scope of this 
thesis but useful for consideration. Given the limited nature of Gaddafi’s proliferation, 
were continued U.S. unilateral sanctions after the multilateral period prudent?   Economic 
woe fueled the firestorm of the Arab Spring.   Libya was a tinderbox of economic 
problems that sanctions, combined with Gaddafi’s policies, helped create. The Arab 
Spring lit the spark that burned down Gaddafi’s regime. The aftermath of the Libyan civil 
war has been instability that claimed the life of the U.S. ambassador to Libya and seen 
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the spread of Islamist groups that Gaddafi himself feared. The Libyan Civil War sucked 
NATO and the U.S. into another military intervention in the Middle East, and created a 
conventional weapons proliferation risk from items like shoulder fired surface to air 
missiles. However, given the fact that Libya was a nuclear proliferator the answer must 
be yes, the sanctions should have stayed in place in order to stop Gaddafi’s nuclear 
ambitions. The threats spawned by the Libyan Civil War are much more manageable 
without the added factor of nuclear weapons. In the end, Gaddafi’s demise was his own 
doing, and the West prevented the potential horrific consequences of loose nuclear 
weapons in a raging civil war. 
  
 57 
IV. IRAQ: A MELANCHOLY BATTLE WON 
The sanctions episode against Iraq began and ended with war. Starting with a 
limited U.S. embargo of chemical sales in 1984 and lasting until officially lifted by the 
UN in 2010, sanctions against Iraq present a tragic bookend to the sanctions era that the 
victory over apartheid began. The Iraq case represents a proliferation victory in the sense 
Saddam Hussein was stripped of his WMD, but it was a pyrrhic victory for the senders 
and a tragedy for the Iraqi people. Uncertainty about proliferation prompted the U.S. to 
invade Iraq, and despite the absence of WMD, many still believe the Iraq case discredits 
the utility of sanctions as a nonproliferation tool. Further, the humanitarian impact on the 
people of Iraq demonstrated the consequences of economic coercion with the Iraqi people 
suffering the whims of both sides. The humanitarian impact of the Iraq episode created 
the impetus for the implementation of so-called smart sanctions, which as of this writing, 
are being put to the test in Iran.    
The perceived failure of sanctions in Iraq also creates the impetus for military 
action against Iran as the only “sure” solution to end Iranian nuclear ambitions. However, 
as the cases of South African and Libya demonstrated, sanctions can be a useful tool for 
ending proliferation as long as a viable political solution for all sides is available. With 
Iraq, there was little room for compromise, and the perceived failure of sanctions to 
disarm Saddam Hussein were as much a function of internal politics on both sides as they 
were a proliferation issue. The truth is that Saddam Hussein disarmed, as will be 
discussed later in this case study, well before Secretary of State Colin Powell’s infamous 
2002 address to the UN about Iraq’s illicit arsenals but the dictator was politically unable 
to admit it until the very end. The Bush administration chose to invade rather than wait 
for verification of disarmament—a decision that would drag the U.S. into a lingering 
insurgency and cost it much of its credibility regarding proliferation issues. 
A. IRAQ: BUILT FOR VIOLENCE 
Iraq is a nearly land locked artificiality carved from the post-First World War 
remains of the Ottoman Empire. The borders of Iraq encompass roughly 168,000 square 
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miles of territory with only 36 miles of coastline.203  Almost from its inception, Iraq’s 
access to the Persian Gulf has been threatened, a contributing factor in two of Iraq’s wars. 
Additionally, Iraq is surrounded by powerful rivals and its borders sit astride cultural and 
religious fault lines that pull it apart from within and without. Within this context, the 
state of Iraq does not reflect anything that can be accurately called the nation of Iraq.   It 
is little wonder that anyone trying to govern it resorts to brutality and violence both on its 
neighbors and populace.   
The artificiality of Iraq led to the lack of institutionalization, which in turn drove a 
series of violent changes of power.204  Iraq’s system of political violence began in the 
1930s when military coups targeted the monarchy that the British had installed in the 
1920s.205  Iraqi nationalists who had attempted to overthrow the Monarchy clashed with 
the British Army in 1941. In 1958, a military coup led by General Abd al-Karim Qasim 
overthrew the monarchy and immediately began to clash with the Ba’ath party over 
support Nasser’s Pan Arab ideas, which the Ba’athist supported.206  Eventually, the 
military overthrew General Qasim, which in turn set motion another series of power 
struggles for control of Iraq. The Ba’athists eventually consolidated power and took 
control.207 
Against this backdrop, Saddam Hussein came to power, first as a presidential 
deputy and later as President. Upon assuming role as President, Hussein violently 
consolidated power and his rule lasted from 1979 until 2003 when he was ousted by the 
U.S. led invasion of Iraq.208  Saddam’s Ba’athism was a mix of Arab nationalism and 
socialism that evolved into a personality cult and patronage network designed to keep 
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him and his inner circle in power.209  He built Iraq’s economy on a state planned model, 
and viewed Iraq as a natural leader in Middle Eastern affairs. In the 1970s, Iraq’s oil 
revenues skyrocketed which facilitated military expansion.210  It was in this period that 
Iraq began to seek nuclear and chemical weapons.    
Regional rivalries and the desire for power fueled Saddam Hussein’s pursuit of 
WMD. He viewed Iraq’s proper place as the dominant power in the region, and WMD 
was a way to insure Iraq’s dominance over regional rivals.211  Further, two regional 
rivals, Israel and Iran, already had nuclear programs to go along with a history of regional 
tensions. Iraq had participated in the failed Arab campaigns against the Israelis, and like 
Gaddafi, Saddam Hussein rejected Nasser’s peace with Israel viewing confrontation with 
Jewish state as an opportunity to assert himself in the Arab world.212   In Iran, the Shah 
had started the Iranian nuclear program that Saddam Hussein felt compelled to match.213  
B. THE ORIGIN OF SADDAM’S BOMB 
Like many other proliferators, Iraq’s nuclear program had its origins in the Atoms 
for Peace program in the 1950s. Iraq received initial assistance from the U.S., and then 
later from the Soviet Union. In 1967, a Soviet-built 2-megawat reactor began operation at 
the Tuwaitha site in Iraq.214 Iraq signed the NPT in 1968 and ratified it in 1969.215  In the 
interim, the Ba’athists seized power. 
Iraq began a covert program pursuing a nuclear weapon in 1971 while 
maintaining the outward look of compliance by placing its nuclear activities under IAEA 
safeguards.216  In 1973, the French agreed to build the Osirak nuclear reactor in exchange 
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for oil concessions.217  At the same time, Saddam Hussein ordered the Iraqi intelligence 
services to penetrate the IAEA in order to learn how to subvert the inspection process.218  
Iraq continued to seek training and outside assistance for its nuclear engineers and 
scientists who over time built the required expertise to run a nuclear weapons program. 
Construction on the Osirak reactor began, and Iraq began seeking import sources of 
yellowcake and other nuclear materials.219  The region became unsettled over the reactor 
and many correctly interpreted it as a clear sign that Iraq was seeking a nuclear 
capability. In fact, the region had good reason for this concern because Iraq planned to 
use the reactor to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons.220   
C. IRAN AND SADDAM’S EDUCATION IN THE STRATEGIC UTILITY OF 
WMD 
The Iranian revolution presented both a strategic threat and opportunity for 
Saddam Hussein. There was already strategic tension between the two nations. In 1971, 
after the British withdrew the last of their troops from the Persian Gulf region, the 
Iranians had seized two strategic islands, Greater and Lesser Tunbs, at the mouth of the 
Persian Gulf. This exacerbated Iraqi fears of being shut out of their already limited access 
to water and shipping lanes.221  In a further geographical complication, Iraq was 
unsatisfied with the OPEC brokered 1975 Algiers Accords that had settled the border 
dispute between Iran and Iraq in the Shatt-el-Arab waterway at the head of the Persian 
Gulf.222  Geography and demographics combined to form the final strategic threat to Iran 
generated by the Iranian revolution. Iraq’s southern oil fields and its diminutive strip of 
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coastal access is dominated by Shias. If the revolution spread to this population, as 
Khomeini had already agitated for, Iraq could lose control of these vital areas. 223   
However, the Iranian military was reeling from the revolution, and Saddam 
Hussein sensed opportunity within the risks. Iraq had an opportunity to expand its access 
to the Persian Gulf, further assert itself the region, and improve relations with the West, 
especially the U.S..224  Diplomatic relations between Iraq and the U.S. had soured after 
Iraq’s involvement in the 1967 war against Israel, but Saddam saw that he now had a 
mutual enemy with the U.S. in Iran. In September 1980, rather than wait for the 
revolution to spread into his border, Iraq attacked.   
Iran feared Iraq’s nuclear programs, and just after the start of the Iran-Iraq war in 
1980, the Iranians attempted to bomb the Osirak reactor but failed.225  Later in June of 
1981, the Israelis destroyed the Osirak reactor in a precision bombing raid. The raid on 
Osirak did not stop Iraq’s nuclear ambitions. It forced the Iraqis to shift their emphasis 
from plutonium to HEU, and Iraq invested in every viable method of uranium enrichment 
ranging from centrifuges, electromagnetic separation, and laser isotope separation.226   
Beyond the setback of the raid on Osirak, Saddam’s instinct that the Iranian Army 
was in flux in the wake of the revolution proved correct, and the Iraqi attack send the 
Iranians reeling. However, Saddam failed to establish strategic and operational goals for 
his Army. The Iranians recovered from the initial shock of the invasion and the war 
quickly devolvement into a primitive war of attrition, which as it dragged out threatened 
to topple Saddam’s Ba’athist regime from power.227  Harkening back to the brutal 
stalemate of the First World War, Saddam turned to unconventional weapons to break the 
stalemate against Iran.228  Iraq used chemical weapons extensively against the Iranians. 
The Iranians developed their own chemical weapons program in response that they 
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quickly abandoned after the war, but not before demonstrating the utility of 
unconventional weapons to both sides. 229 
The war also saw both sides use of missile strikes to target each other’s cities. The 
war would last until 1988 when the UN brokered a cease-fire. Iraq made no gains in 
territory and incurred a heavy cost in both lives and treasure.230  In fact, for a period 
during the war, Iraq’s fears of being landlocked were realized when an Iranian offensive 
cut off Iraq’s Persian Gulf access.231  Instead of becoming the Arab leader of the region, 
Saddam had to rely on other nations like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia for access to the Gulf, 
and borrowed over $20 billion from Kuwait to finance the war with Iran.232  
As much as the Iraqi military adventure into Iran proved to be a failure, Saddam’s 
political instincts about the U.S. proved correct. The U.S. removed Iraq from the State 
Sponsors of Terror list in 1983.233  Diplomatic relations between the two nations were 
restored in 1984, and the U.S. provided intelligence about Iran to Iraq.234  The U.S. was  
largely willing to ignore Iraqi misbehaviors during this period. The U.S. Congress 
advocated sanctions against Iraq because of its chemical weapons use against Iran and the 
Iraqi Kurds. In another instance similar to the South Africa case, the geopolitical situation 
of the day trumped proliferation concerns. President Ronald Reagan had the proposed 
sanctions legislation amended to give him the power to enact them, and during this 
period, no economic sanctions were placed on Iraq.235  The only steps the U.S. took 
against Iraq’s burgeoning chemical warfare programs were to an embargo on the sale 
chemical weapons precursors.236   
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Beyond the minor impediment of chemical sales, U.S. tolerance of Saddam’s 
misbehavior extended to even when American lives were at stake. In 1978, during the so-
called Tanker War period of the Iran-Iraq War, a case of mistaken identity caused Iraqi 
warplanes to bomb the USS Stark killing dozens of U.S. sailors. The U.S. did not punish 
Iraq over this but instead blamed Iran for creating the tension in the Persian Gulf that led 
to the attack.237 
The U.S. and Iraq weren’t exactly allies, but relations weren’t bad either. 
President George H.W. Bush decided to follow a policy of constructive engagement with 
Baghdad after the Iran-Iraq War ended. Iraq became the ninth largest importer of U.S. 
agricultural goods.238  The immediate period after the war saw Iraq’s GDP grow to $48 
billion, nearly what it had been in 1979 prior to the war and its subsequent crash to $32 
billion in 1981.239 Despite this improvement, Saddam’s ambitions were not satisfied, and 
turned his eyes south to Kuwait.   
D. THE MOTHER OF ALL SANCTIONS REGIMES 
The drumbeats to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait began soon after the war with Iran 
ended. Iraq had a disputed border with Kuwait, and accused Kuwait of taking advantage 
of the Iran-Iraq war to covertly pump oil in Iraqi territory using slant drilling 
techniques.240  Iraq also accused Kuwait and other countries of exceeding their OPEC oil 
production quotas and keeping oil prices artificially low, which in turn forced Iraq to 
borrow more money from Kuwait.241  The Saudis hosted a series of talks between 
Kuwait and Iraq in hopes of resolving the situation.   
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In the interim, the thawing relations between Baghdad and Washington began to 
chill. Iraq’s nuclear proliferation continued, and Iraqi nuclear scientists were working on 
creating a small arsenal of HEU implosion weapons by April of 1991.242  The Iraqi 
nuclear program did not deliver the bombs on time, but the Bush Administration began to 
have concerns over Iraq’s nuclear programs. In one of several similar incidents, British 
customs inspectors had seized U.S. made components bound for Iraq that could be used 
in nuclear bomb triggers.243   In response, the U.S. imposed export controls over sensitive 
nuclear technology.244  In July of 1990, the U.S. Congress passed legislation limiting 
agricultural export credit benefits to sales of countries accused of human right violations, 
proliferation, and terror sponsorship. Iraq was on the list of violators, and the legislation 
would have cost Iraq $1 billion in annual import credits.245   
The Saudi Arabian led attempts at diplomacy failed, and Kuwait refused to meet 
Iraqi demands. The talks collapsed on the eve of the invasion, and on August 2, 1990, 
Iraq invaded Kuwait. Saddam Hussein’s brazenness shocked the world into action. In an 
operation that would soon be dubbed Operation Desert Shield, the U.S. quickly went into 
action by mobilizing and broad coalition and dispatching forces to Saudi Arabia to 
prevent Iraq from attacking further south. The UN moved quickly,   and four days after 
the Iraqi invasion, the UNSC passed UNSCR 661 demanding the Iraqi withdrawal from 
Kuwait and imposing a near total trade, oil, and financial embargo.246  As the sanction 
tightened over the coming months, the UN hoped that they would force a political 
solution to Iraq aggressiveness without a war to eject it from Kuwait. Prominent U.S. 
senators argued that Iraq could be economically bludgeoned into submission.247 
On the surface, Iraq was vulnerable to sanctions. Like Libya, its economy was 
depended on oil with 95% of its foreign currency earnings and 60% of its GDP derived 
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from oil revenue.248  Iraq’s economy quickly collapsed and its GDP plummeted.249  
However, chances of the sanctions’ success were impeded by two factors identified in the 
ESR study. Dictatorships are often extremely resilient to economic hardship, and 
sanctions rarely work at ending military adventures. Iraq remained in Kuwait, and 
Saddam Hussein’s rhetoric grew more defiant. On November 29, 1900, the UNSCR 678 
authorized member states to liberate Kuwait if Iraq did not withdraw by January 15, 
1991.250   
Sanctions did not force Iraq from Kuwait. The UN deadline passed, and a broad 
U.S.-led coalition launched Operation Desert Storm that would deliver a crushing defeat 
to Iraq and quickly liberate Kuwait. On February 28 1991, coaltion forces halted their 
advance and an informal ceasefire went into effect. The UN passed UNSRC 686 
outlining the terms of Iraqi compliance with a formal ceasefire to which Iraq agreed.251 
In short order, the Shias in southern Iraq and the Kurds in the north, encouraged by U.S. 
calls to rise up against Saddam Hussein’s regime, were in open revolt. His military in 
disarray, Saddam’s Hussein’s days in power seemed numbered. 
During the war, WMD were a rhetorical factor, but not a military one. Iraq had 
grown to see CB weapons as “strategic” in nature for use against cities in nearby 
countries.252  During the war, Iraq reportedly armed some of its missiles with CB 
warheads, and dispersed them with orders for use only if Baghdad was threatened.253  
President Bush responded by putting Iraq on notice that the use of CB weapons was a red 
line that would cause massive retaliation. The war passed without the employment of 
unconventional weapons by either side. However, as will be discussed, later in this case 
study, the post-war period revealed the extent of Iraq’s WMD efforts and precipitated a 
long-term crisis that would ultimately lead to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. 
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A month after the end of the conflict, the UN passed UNSCR 687 that formally 
outlined the terms of the ceasefire and set eight conditions for the lifting of sanctions. 
UNSCR 687 demanded the following: 
• Formal recognition of UN demarcated borders with Kuwait. 
• The establishment of a demilitarized zone with UN peacekeepers along the 
Iraq-Kuwait border. 
• Elimination of Iraq’s CB weapons and long-range missile programs and 
the acceptance of UN monitors to insure compliance. 
• Elimination of Iraq’s nuclear programs under IAEA supervision. 
• The return of stolen Kuwaiti property. 
• Iraqi acceptance of war damage liability and a compensation fund to be 
managed by the UN. 
• Repatriation of all Kuwaiti and third party nationals. 
• An Iraqi commitment not to support acts of international terrorism.254 
Iraq accepted the UN’s terms yet remained defiant, labeling UNSCR 687 as an 
assault on its sovereignty.255 In the meantime, Saddam Hussein went about ruthlessly 
preserving his regime. The remnants of his military that had withstood the punishing 
allied assault, especially the elite Republican Guards units that had been able to escape 
Kuwait, reconstituted and began to put down the rebellious Iraqi population. In response, 
the U.S. and UK implemented Operations Northern and Southern watch which included 
“no-fly” and “no-drive” zones for the Iraqi military in hopes of averting an outright 
civilian slaughter. Under the protection of allied air cover, the Kurds in the north were 
able to carve out autonomous bits of territory that they were able to hold until the fall of 
the regime in 2003. The Shias in the south did not fare as well, and their rebellion was 
suppressed. Most importantly to Saddam Hussein, the regime retained control of Iraq’s 
northern and southern oilfields. 
With the uprisings put down or at least contained, Saddam set about re-tightening 
his grip on power. The bombing campaigns of Operation Desert Storm had crippled Iraqi 
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infrastructure, and the sanctions prevented importing of goods required to rebuild it.256  
The regime stayed in power by taking care of the elites in Baghdad and stripping other 
areas of parts to repair the capital’s infrastructure.257  Repair in rebellious areas was 
ignored, and Saddam was able to further placate Baghdad elites. Further, he appealed to 
Iraqi nationalism and convinced the Sunni’s that he had saved them from the Shia 
uprising and the specter of Iran.258   
The sanctions deeply affected the Iraqi economy, but the population had grown 
used to privation as it struggled through the Iran-Iraq War.259  Iraq’s lack of economic 
sophistication also helped Saddam stay in power. Because Iraq’s economy was oil-
dependent and undiversified, there was no manufacturing or business contingent like 
what had existed in South Africa to placate.260  The Iraqi population viewed Saddam as 
ruthless and the elites were placated enough to hold onto power.261  Western policy 
makers had expected Saddam Hussein to fall and expected sanctions to speed this 
along.262  Yet, the dictator proved a survivor. 
E. THE UNFINISHED WAR 
Against this backdrop, the UN began the implementation of UNSCR 687, and 
weapons inspectors from the IAEA and United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) 
entered Iraq to begin the work of dismantling its WMD programs. UNSCR 687, 
combined with sanctions, and the actions of the IAEA and UNSCOM deserve credit for 
ending most of Iraq’s proliferation, especially its nuclear activities.   The IAEA 
dismantled Iraq’ nuclear capacity and either removed or safeguarded sensitive nuclear 
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materials.263  UNSCOM was able to account for and dismantle much of Iraq’s CB and 
missile programs. The import restriction placed on Iraq under UNSCR 687 prevented 
Iraq from replacing these items. Further, the former UNSCOM director Rolf Ekeus 
concluded that sanctions were important at pressuring the Iraqis to accept UN 
inspectors.264  Military and diplomatic pressure also played a role, but the crush of the 
sanctions influenced Baghdad’s decision-making.265 
For the most part, Iraq complied with the implementation of UNSCR 687, but as 
time passed, it grew defiant. This defiance soon began to escalate setting the stage for 
continued confrontations with Iraq. The confrontations would eventually lead to war 
compelling many to conclude that sanctions had failed. This is not the case. 
In the Sanctions Decade, Cortright and Lopez argue that the UNSCR 687 
sanctions were more successful than given credit. Iraq, they argue, complied at least in 
part to all but one of the UN demands.266  The only UNSCR 687 demand that Iraq failed 
to meet was a denunciation of international terrorism.267  The ESR study echoes this. 
Sanctions had failed to eject Iraq from Kuwait, but they kept Iraq from  rearming.268  
Yet, the rhetoric of U.S. policy makers never reflect this. 
In The Sanctions Decade, Cortright and Lopez argue that the UNSCR 687 
sanctions ultimately failed to produce conclusive results because the senders failed to 
follow a bargaining model.269  Iraq’s partial compliance with UNSCR 687 should have 
merited an easing of sanctions. In the mid-1990s, France and Russia began to argue this 
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point.270  Of course, both countries had economic interests in Iraq, and Iraq remained out 
of compliance with UNSCR 687. However, the  
In the meantime, the sanctions precipitated a humanitarian crisis that Saddam 
deftly exploited. Unemployment, inflation, and child mortality skyrocketed.271 The rise 
in food prices made most families dependent on government rationing programs, which 
helped further solidify the regime’s control over society.272  Saddam Hussein had also 
constructed what amounted to an internal embargo.273  Rebel areas were denied resources 
making the humanitarian crisis look that much worse while taking care of Baghdad. 
Instead of falling from power, Saddam Hussein proved a cunning survivor. He turned his 
sights on fracturing the coalition against him. 
The full accounting of WMD became the focal point of the UN and the West’s 
struggles against Iraq; however, the same factors that had caused Iraq to proliferate 
remained. Iraq nearly landlocked geo-political position had not improved, its military was 
now shattered and humiliated, and it was being strangled by sanctions. The regime was 
forced to project an aura of power and ruthlessness to hold onto power, and deter further 
revolts or Iranian action. The regime viewed WMD as strategic weapons so giving them 
up had to be accompanied by relief. If the regime were to survive, it had to see an 
economic way out before giving up a key tool in keeping power. From the outside, it 
looked as if Saddam Hussein would sacrifice anything to hold onto his WMD.274  Given 
the regime’s record of aggressive behavior, this was a reasonable conclusion even if, as 
Cortright and Lopez conclude, there should have been more focus on bargaining with 
Iraq. 
In 1994, Saddam Hussein saw that no progress was being made towards his goals. 
He decided to escalate the situation and massed troops along the Kuwaiti border.275  
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France, Russia, and the UN’s Kofi Annan intervened to defuse the crisis. Saddam 
realized that each provocation further frayed the coalition against him and continued to 
escalate his rhetoric and actions. He demanded a timetable for the lifting of sanctions and 
continued the harassment of the UNSCOM inspectors.276 The back and forth between the 
UN and Iraq over WMD and inspections continued throughout the 1990s. In 1995, Iraq 
accepted the UN oil for food program where Iraqi oil revenue would be used to provide 
aid for its civilian populace, and the program soon evolved into the largest humanitarian 
relief operation in history.277  This staved off internal political and economic turmoil 
allowing continued defiance from the regime.278   
Initially, the ongoing UNSCOM crisis had created a rift in the coalition of senders 
by exposing differences in goals towards Iraq. However, the senders were unwilling to 
tolerate Saddam’s continued defiance at the expense of the Iraqi people. Those that 
intervened to defuse previous crisis felt humiliated and betrayed.279  President Clinton 
had taken office seeking to engage with Iraq, but now his views had shifted to the belief 
that Iraq would never comply with UNSCR 687 as long as Saddam Hussein stayed in 
power.280  In 1995, Hussein Kamel, Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law and Minister of 
Military Industries, defected to Jordan  claiming extensive knowledge of Iraq’s WMD 
programs. His cooperation with UNSCOM led the U.S. to believe that Iraq had not fully 
revealed the extent of its WMD programs, which further escalated the crisis.281 
The idea that Saddam’s removal was the only way to disarm Iraq gained 
momentum. Secretary of State Albright in a 1997 speech at Georgetown hinted at the 
idea that as long as Saddam stayed so would sanctions.282  On October 31, 1998, 
President Clinton signed the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (ILA) that formally declared, “It 
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should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime headed 
by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic 
government to replace that regime.”283 The act also called for the establishment of war 
crimes tribunals against Saddam Hussein and his inner circle.284  The political impasse 
was now official policy. In December 15, 1998, after a month of final political wrangling 
with Iraq, the UN declared the Iraq inspections a failure and formally withdrew 
UNSCOM inspectors.285  The next day the U.S. and UK launched a four night bombing 
campaign against Iraq dubbed Operation Desert Fox.   
The backlash against the attacks was almost immediate. France, Russian, and 
China balked at not being consulted before the launch of military operations, and protests 
over the attack spread throughout the Arab world.286  The rift amoung the senders was 
now dramatically exposed. The U.S. wanted to continue the pressure against Iraq, and 
Iraq responded in kind by beginning more frequently targeting of aircraft enforcing 
Operations Southern and North Watch. The U.S. modified the rules of engagement for 
the missions that allowed more extensive strikes in response to Iraqi aggressiveness. The 
result was almost daily bombings that further enraged the Arab world and continued to 
fracture the coalition against Iraq.287  As the 1990s ended, much of the world favored 
loosening the sanctions, and some countries began pursuing normalized trade 
relations.288   
UNSCOM was disbanded by the UN in late 1999 and replaced under UN 
Resolution 1284 by the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission 
(UNMOVIC). Resolution 1284 stated that 120 days of Iraqi cooperation with inspectors 
would result in the suspension of sanctions and allow the resumed imports, except 
military and dual-use items such a biological fermenters or certain chemical only useful 
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in manufacturing chemical weapons.289  Russia, China, and France abstained from voting 
on UNSCR 1284, and Iraq rejected the terms of the resolution.290  In 2000, the Iraq-Syria 
oil pipeline re-opened, and an emboldened Iraq began to impose a “surcharge” that went 
directly into the Iraqi treasury on each barrel sold under the oil for food program.291  Not 
only had Saddam Hussein survived the decade following Desert Storm, it looked like he 
might be winning. 
F. AXIS OF EVIL 
President George W. Bush inherited the Iraq mess from the Clinton 
administration, and at first, it looked as if the U.S. policy might change. Early in the Bush 
administration, Secretary of State Collin Powell sought to modify the sanctions regime 
and liberalize trade while restricting dual-use items.292  Powell hoped these modifications 
would mitigate the humanitarian crisis and heal the rift among the sender coalition. The 
U.S. expended significant political capital in negotiating changes to the sanctions and was 
opposed by countries like Russia, which had significant commercial interests in the full 
lifting of sanctions.293  In the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the U.S. gained 
enough political room to negotiate a restructuring to the sanctions against Iraq, and 
impose a “smart sanctions” regime with UNSCR 1409 that sought to contain Iraqi 
military capability while allowing the resurrection of the Iraqi economy.294 
However, the same event that facilitated Powell’s restructuring of the sanctions 
dramatically shifted the U.S. approach to foreign policy, which became much more 
aggressive in the wake of the September 11th attacks. Iraq was soon labeled as part of the 
axis of evil. The classified 2002 Nuclear Posture Review made specific mention of 
                                                 
289 Ibd. 
290 Ibid., 120–121. 
291 Ibid., 121. 
292 Ibid., 121–122. 
293 Ibid., 122. 
294 Ibid. 
 73 
nuclear contingencies involving Iraq.295  Collin Powell was soon back before the UN 
insisting that Iraq’s WMD were now a renewed threat and that Iraq was covertly re-
arming. National Security Advisor Condelleza Rice worried aloud that proof of Iraq’s 
WMD programs might take the form of a mushroom cloud.296  Iraq was accused of 
attempting to buy yellowcake uranium from Niger. In response to U.S. pressure, the UN 
passed UNSCR 1441 that renewed the call for Iraqi compliance with UNSCR 687.297   
This new resolution did not change the terms of the UN demands from Iraq, but made a 
final demand for compliance. WMD disarmament remained the goal; however, the 
United States seemed on the verge of invading Iraq in order to topple Saddam Hussein. 
In November of 2002, Saddam Hussein agreed to allow IAEA and UNMOVIC 
inspectors to enter Iraq. Under the threat of military action, the Iraqis cooperated with this 
new round of inspections, and in early March of 2003, the UN reported its preliminary 
results. The IAEA inspectors concluded that Iraq had not resumed its quest for a nuclear 
weapon, had not imported yellowcake from Niger. (In fact, 550 metric tons of yellowcake 
was already in Iraq left over from previous nuclear efforts. It was later removed by a 
secret U.S. task force in 2008.298) Iraq’s industrial and scientific capacity had withered in 
the last decade.299  UNMOVIC inspectors found a few old chemical shells that had been 
manufactured prior to Desert Storm, but did not find any evidence that Iraq had renewed 
its chemical warfare program.300 The inspectors found discrepancies in Iraqi 
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documentation of the destruction of its biological warfare program but no evidence of 
renewed activity.301   
This lack of evidence did not convince the Bush administration. Instead, the 
minor discrepancies seemed to indicate that there had to be something more sinister that 
Saddam Hussein was hiding. The U.S. had concluded a large military buildup in the 
region as the UN inspectors presented their initial findings. The Bush administration 
remained unconvinced, and on March 17, 2003, President Bush gave Saddam Hussein 
and his sons 48 hours to leave Iraq or face military action.302  Saddam remained defiant, 
the U.S. and the “coalition of the willing” invaded. Three weeks later Baghdad fell to 
U.S. forces.   
Behind the invasion forces, specialized teams of U.S. troops scoured the Iraqi 
desert for evidence of Iraq’s hidden WMD programs. They found none. Saddam’s 
resistance over WMD had all been a bluff designed to deter internal and external threats 
while buying time to have the sanctions lifted.303  In the wake of the invasion, U.S. 
officials concluded that Saddam retained the desire to acquire WMD, but had unilaterally 
destroyed himself what the UNSCOM inspectors had not.   
David Kay, head of the Iraq Survey Group tasked with finding Iraq’s WMD, told 
Congress in October of 2003 that there was no indication that Iraq had taken any step to 
renew its nuclear weapons programs.304  He stated that Iraq had an “interest” in renewing 
its program but had not acted on them. Later, Charles Duelfer, who replaced Kay as the 
head of the Iraq Survey Group confirmed these findings, and concluded that Iraq had no 
formal plans to reconstitute its nuclear weapons programs in the year prior to the 
invasion.305  He echoed Kay’s assertions about Saddam’s desires for WMD, but these 
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desires had not translated into action.306  Other post-war findings about Iraq’s CB 
programs mirrored the conclusions regarding the nuclear program. Saddam desired CB 
weapons, but did nothing to aquire them after Desert Storm. Iraq was a nonproliferation 
success, but one that took a war to finally expose.  
Shortly after the invasion, Iraq erupted into a bloody insurgency in part fueled by 
the inability of the coalition to restore basic services like water and electricity. The 
sanctions that had contained Iraq’s military and WMD capacity at the expense of 
rebuilding its infrastructure now proved a lethal driver of instability. In the wake of the 
invasion, the UN passed UNSCR 1483 that lifted the non-military sanctions on Iraq and 
reaffirmed the need to confirm WMD disarmament.307 A later resolution in 2007 
formally disbanded UNMOVIC and called on the new Iraqi government to continue to 
work with the UN and IAEA to confirm the final disposition of its WMD programs.308  
In 2010, the UN voted to lift all sanctions on Iraq.309 It had taken two decades of 
sanctions and two wars to end Iraq’s WMD threat. 
G. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION: BEWARE ABSOLUTES 
The post-Saddam Hussein Iraqi government has moved to comply with 
international proliferation norms. In 2008, Iraq signed the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty. Then in 2009, Iraq acceded to the CWC. It had already ratified the BWC as part 
of the Desert Storm cease-fire agreement, and was already a signatory to the NPT.   The 
Iraqi constitution adopted in 2005 formally banned the acquisition of WMD.   In 2009, 
the Iraqi parliament began considering a series of non-proliferation laws that would 
firmly cement the country in compliance with its treaty obligations.   These efforts led to 
the formal lifting of all UN sanctions against Iraq in 2010. Iraq is now fully back in the 
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international fold regarding WMD. However, a brutal path led to this point. A 
combination of sanctions, diplomacy, inspections, and force worked in disarming Iraq 
and keeping it disarmed.   
Clearly, sanctions worked at disarming Iraq, but when they were combined with 
other policy goals, they created a political impasse. Daniel Drezner in The Sanctions 
Paradox states that non-negotiable demands and sanction do not mix.310    Thus, 
sanctions, when combined with U.S. calls for regime change, created the gridlock that 
Drezner predicted. Saddam Hussein was never going to negotiate his regime out of 
power, but as evidenced by his signals to the UN that he wanted a timeline for the lifting 
of sanctions and his own final unilateral disarmament, he was willing to cede some 
ground to the UN. In the end, sanctions achieved almost all of the UN’s goals in Iraq, and 
they are not to blame for the failures that followed them.  
There are three key failures of American politics and policy in the Iraq case that 
created the conditions for failure. First, the U.S. mostly ignored Iraqi proliferation and 
chemical weapons use as long as it suited U.S. purposes, mainly vengeance against Iran. 
Iraq used these weapons with impunity and then developed a strategic understanding of 
their utility. This utility was reinforced by the Iraqi experience in Desert Storm where, at 
least in Iraq’s internal regime calculations, WMD had helped keep the U.S. out of 
Baghdad. Had the U.S. opposed Iraq’s chemical weapons use more firmly in the 
beginning, it could have helped limit Saddam Hussein’s view of their strategic utility. 
Saddam Hussein never got a clear signal that WMD were more trouble than they were 
worth until it was already part of his regime survival strategy. 
Second, the signing of the ILA by President Clinton was a diplomatic blunder that 
legislated the schism in goals between the senders. UNSCR 687 compliance had nothing 
to do with regime change, and by vowing to support the same resistance organizations 
that Saddam Hussein needed the threat of WMD to deter, the ILA created a political 
impasse that neither side could escape. Even had Saddam explicitly complied with every 
element of UNSCR 687, the policy of the United States, minus a formal Congressional 
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reversal, would have still been regime change. Clearly, Congress has a role in 
implementing a legal framework to U.S. sanctions policy. However, in this case Congress 
over-reached, and President Clinton should not have signed the act. 
The third and final failure of U.S. politics was the huge amount of international 
political capital that President Bush invested and then lost in the idea that Iraq had 
rearmed and that the struggle against Saddam Hussein must be seen in terms of good 
versus evil. This illustrates the argument against sanctions made by Adeno Addis’  
“Economic Sanctions and the Problem of Evil” article. Instead of looking at the problem 
as one that was just a few steps away from being solved, the Bush administration, in a 
continuation of Clinton administration policies, used the whole episode as a way of 
marking identity in the emerging Global War on Terror—you’re either with us or against 
us. It staked the credibility of its administration and the revered warrior-statesman Colin 
Powell on faulty intelligence, and then conducted a threatening military buildup along 
Iraq’s borders. This military threat influenced Saddam to allow UNMOVIC back into 
Iraq, but it also raised the political stakes for the U.S.. On the eve of the invasion, 
UNMOVIC inspectors had concluded that Iraq seemed to be in compliance with UNSCR 
687. Under the terms of UNSCR 1284, these findings, combined with 120 days of 
cooperation, would have paved the way for the suspension of the sanctions.   
The suspension of sanctions with U.S. troops massed on his border could have 
been a political victory for Saddam Hussein. He would have been able to play both the 
victim and the victor. If Saddam Hussein did, in fact, plan on someday reinvigorating his 
WMD programs this would have provided him the political capital to do so. The next 
time the U.S. came knocking with evidence of an Iraqi WMD buildup all Saddam would 
have needed to do was point to Powell’s discredited testimony before the UN. By 
elevating the stakes too high and conflating Iraq’s intransigence with nuclear attack on an 
American city, the Bush Administration gave Saddam Hussein political opportunity.   
Assuming that the Bush administration wanted to avoid war and as the world’s 
sole superpower could weather ceding a political victory to Saddam Hussein, it already 
had a peaceful way out. The U.S. was already negotiating with Gaddafi so cutting a deal 
with a dictator was not beyond what the U.S. was prepared to do, although Iraq was much 
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more of an issue that Libya. UNSCR 1284 had already established a mechanism to 
prevent the import of military and dual-use items, and Powell’s efforts had showed that 
smart sanctions were diplomatically viable. The threat of force legitimated in UNSCR 
1441 brought Iraq back to the negotiating table, and UNSCR 1284 could have provided a 
carrot-and-stick approach to pave the way for Iraq’s long-term compliance. The key to 
this would have been to balance the threat posed by Iraq’s WMD with the rhetoric of 
good versus evil, which elevated a contained regional nuisance into an existential threat.   
As with the case of Libya, the suspension of sanctions versus the lifting of 
sanctions could have also provided the incentive for continued Iraqi compliance. 
Sanctions had already worked at disarming Iraq, and there was a mechanism for a 
peaceful final resolution to Iraq’s proliferation. Instead, the U.S. ignored the success of 
sanctions, and chose to invade Iraq only to find, at the expense of thousands of U.S. and 
Iraqi lives, that the issue had already resolved itself. There good news in this case. Iraq 
has come back into compliance with international proliferations norms. However, the 
U.S. limped out of Iraq damaged and struggling to admit that it had won the proliferation 
battle in Iraq before the first shots were fired. 
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V. EVALUATING THE CASE STUDIES: THE LESSONS FROM 
SANCTIONS AND COMBATING PROLIFERATION 
Each of the case studied in the previous chapters provides a variety of lessons for 
the interaction of sanctions, proliferation, and policy. The recommendations and cautions 
of the ESR study discussed in the first chapter of this thesis have explanatory power in 
each of the case studies. To review, the eight policy recommendations of the ESR study 
were: 
1. “Don’t bite off more than you can chew.”  Sanctions with modest goals 
work best and strong countries are harder to compel. 
2. “Friends are more likely to comply than Adversaries.”  Sanctions against 
trading partners or friends were likely to work, but sanctions against 
adversarial nations were likely to fail. 
3. “Beware Autocratic Regimes.”  Economic coercion is unlikely to work on 
dictators, and conversely, has a better change of working on democracies. 
4. “Slam the Hammer, Don’t Turn the Screw.”  Sanctions that are 
implemented quickly are the best as they leave the target little time to 
react and adjust.   
5. “More is Not Necessarily Merrier.” Large coalitions of sender countries 
do not necessarily make sanctions more likely to succeed. 
6. “Choose the Right Tool for the Job.” Deploying sanctions along with 
military or covert actions against belligerents can serve to diminish 
military capacity but is unlikely to result in regime change or policy 
reversals with the target. Senders should be clear on their goals. 
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7. “Don’t Be a Cheapskate or Spendthrift.” Sanctions will have costs to both 
senders and the target. Senders deploying sanctions need to balance the 
cost of sanctions or risk eroding support for their actions. However, 
without inflicting some degree of economic pain, sanctions are unlikely to 
work. 
8. “Look Before You Leap.”  Sanctions can be a Pandora’s Box of hidden 
costs; therefore senders should think through both their means and 
objective before deploying sanctions.311 
The factors that might cause sanctions to fail were: 
1. “Sanctions are not up to the Task.” Often sanctions simply aren’t 
enough to change the behavior of a foreign country. An example in the 
ESR study is that sanctions are unlikely to end military adventures 
once they have begun. Senders cannot sanction their way to peace.312 
2. “Sanctions Create Their Own Antidotes.”  Sanctions may unify 
popular support for the government in the target country and send the 
target in search of economic alternatives. 
3. “Black Knights.” Sanctions may prompt allies or conferees to assist 
the sender in off-setting the effects of sanctions. These alliances may 
be formed because of many interests ranging from ideological to 
commercial interests.  
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4. “Sanctions may Alienate Allies Abroad and Business Interests at 
Home.”  All sanctions create some degree of economic pain. A 
country that is allied with a sanction sender may have interests in the 
target. Alternatively, business interests within the sender country may 
be effected by sanctions and may exert influence in domestic political 
processes.313  
Each case study contains factors present in the ESR that affected the eventual 
outcome. While each case study was a nonproliferation success, South Africa and Libya 
were both nonproliferation and political successes where both countries gave up WMD 
and changed unacceptable behaviors. Iraq was a nonproliferation success, but a bloody 
political failure. In effect, sanctions won almost all the battles, but policy lost the war. 
However, like in war, the success of sanctions was not assured from the start. 
For instance, in all three cases there was a black knight present. With South 
Africa, the U.S. was initially the black knight, willing to ignore apartheid in light of the 
Cold War context. Israel served as an even more potent black knight in South Africa by 
aiding its nuclear proliferation. In Libya, the Soviet Union served as a black knight 
willing to supply Libya with arms and support. In Iraq, the U.S. once again was an early 
black knight and all but ignored Iraqi proliferation as long as the Iranians were punished. 
In Iraq and Libya, oil was a major black knight that gave both countries continuous 
access to money and incentives for outsiders to lift or limit sanctions in order to have 
access to oil. With Iraq, the smart sanctions regime advocated by Collin Powell early in 
the Bush Administration could have mitigated Iraqi oil by limiting its access to weapons 
and technology. 
In all three cases, sanctions “created their own antidotes.” In South Africa, the 
arms embargo was the genesis of the capable South African arms industry that became 
sophisticated enough to build nuclear weapons. In Libya, the initial round of U.S. 
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sanctions caused the Libyans to turn to the European marketplace to sell their oil. Later, 
this stunted the effects of the multilateral sanctions phase as many Europeans were 
hesitant to punish the Libyan too severely and jeopardize cheap oil prices. However, this 
may have had a bonus effect of keeping the economic pressure on Libya low enough not 
to create a humanitarian crisis. This made the sanctions against Libya sustainable over 
long periods, and mitigated the risk of alienating domestic audiences in sender nations.   
In two of the case, sanctions were “the right tool for the job.” In South African 
and Libya, sanctions were not combined with military or covert actions that threatened 
the governments of either country. In Iraq, the opposite was true: sanctions were the right 
tool but used for the wrong job. U.S. policy makers hoped that sanctions would speed 
along Saddam Hussein’s demise. This was contrary to both the UN goals and the utility 
of sanctions stated in the literature. Sanctions should be a tool of coercion, not regime 
change.  
The literature review in the first chapter of this thesis compares sanctions 
literature to the air power theories of Giulio Douhet. The quest for the precise application 
of attacks to devastating effects follows similar paths in both sanctions and air power 
policy. However, looking deeper into military theory might provide better explanatory 
result. The Prussian military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz defined war as an extension of 
policy by other means.314  With this definition in mind, sanctions are essentially a tool of 
economic warfare. One economist, playing off the characterization of economics as “the 
dismal science,” titled his book on economic warfare The Dismal Battlefield.315  
In this sense, Clausewitz’s writings on war hold explanatory power even when 
analyzing sanctions. They argue that war is a balance among the remarkable trinity of 
violence and passion; uncertainty, chance, and probability; and political purpose and 
effect.316  In the case of Iraq, the trinity was unbalanced when the passionate enmity that 
the U.S. had for Saddam Hussein and his regime derailed the political purpose and effect 
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of sanctions against Iraq. Once the ILA was signed, sanctions became not just a tool of 
economic warfare but weapons in an outright unlimited war against Iraq. This does not 
mean that sanctions and economic warfare don’t have a place in waging war, but then 
they are no longer a nonproliferation tool, and any judgment of their effectiveness as one 
should be divorced from the waging of an actual war. 
A new round of smart sanctions and the use of a bargaining model with Iraq could 
have rebalanced Clausewitz’s trinity. Smart sanctions could have affected the ability to 
reduce the cost of sanctions to the senders, kept the coalition together, and allowed for 
the continuation of U.S. nonproliferation goals. Russia, China, and France all wanted 
resumed trade with Iraq, which, minus weapons sales, a smart sanctions regime would 
have allowed. Of course, it is impossible to predict how Saddam Hussein would have 
behaved under a smart sanctions regime. He may have continued his economic exclusion 
of the Kurds and Shias; however, at this point it would clearly have been his doing and 
not the sanction senders. This fact could have allowed the WMD sanctions containing 
Iraq to extend indefinitely or have provided incentives to conform to international norms 
and build trust and collaboration. The smart sanctions regime does nothing to mitigate the 
security threats that Saddam Hussein faced from within and without, and Powell’s smart 
sanctions did nothing to change the ILA. However, the scorecard serves to illustrate the 
potential for sanctions in even the toughest cases. 
In this light, five lessons emerge from the case studies that are important in 
evaluating the potential for sanctions in combating proliferation. They are: 
1. Beware Dragon Slaying. This is an expansion of the ESR study’s first rule of 
not biting off more than you can chew. As stated in the literature review, stopping WMD 
proliferation has held a place of primacy in U.S. national security strategy for more than 
two decades. In the South Africa and Libyan case, the goals of sanctions were relatively 
modest. Ending apartheid was a large shift for Pretoria, but one that was inevitable. The 
world demanded political reform, not exile for the whites. The goal was not to destroy 
South Africa but to, in effect, save it from itself. Ending apartheid would also mean a 
permanent end to rationale for South Africa’s proliferation. Complying with the West’s 
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nonproliferation demands was good evidence that South Africa did intent to carry out 
deep political reforms. 
With Libya, the goals remained modest as well. The senders wanted an end to 
Libyan support to terrorism and proliferation. Given that these two aspects of regime 
behavior were no longer primary drivers in its conduct in international affairs and that 
regime change was not a policy goal for the U.S., there was room for negotiation. A deal 
could be reached. 
With Iraq, the goal became dragon slaying, and the sanctions served as part of a 
strategy to punish Saddam Hussein. Instead of getting rid of the dictator, the sanctions 
created a humanitarian crisis in Iraq that facilitated the fracturing of the sender coalition. 
This illustrates the importance of choosing between fighting evil and ending proliferation. 
Ending Iraq’s proliferation and returning it to normalcy were desirable goals for all 
parties. Regime change—slaying the dragon—was a high price for the U.S. to pay to end 
proliferation that was already dead on the arrival U.S. troops in Baghdad.   
2. Blind Eyes Lead to Blind Alleys. In two of the cases, the U.S. ignored 
proliferation as long as it suited the geopolitical needs of the day. With South Africa, 
Reagan preferred “constructive engagement” instead of punishing Pretoria. With Iraq, 
Reagan also did nothing to counter Iraqi proliferation and use of chemical weapons. 
While a policy of allowing the Iranians to bleed may have been satisfying at the time, it 
facilitated expanded Iraqi proliferation. By not taking a stand in the beginning, the U.S. 
encouraged Saddam Hussein. To dig further into the Iraq case, one of the original drivers 
of Iraq’s desire for nuclear weapons was Iran’s nuclear program under the Shah who was 
a U.S. client and ally. 
There are two other proliferators that the U.S. ignores that played a factor in the 
cases—Israel and Pakistan. The unacknowledged Israeli nuclear program contributed to 
both Libya’s and Iraq’s desire for a nuclear weapon for the Arabs. In the case of South 
Africa, Israel collaborated with the apartheid regime’s nuclear programs. Israel is not a 
signatory to the NPT or the BWC, and is therefore unconstrained by international norms. 
Yet Israel remained in 2010 the second largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid dollars, which 
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totaled $2.2 billion.317  In the 1990s, when the indefinite extension of the NPT was being 
deliberated, several Arab countries, including Libya, wanted Israel to enter the NPT in 
exchange for their vote to extend the treaty.318  Israel countered by offering to agree to a 
Middle East nuclear-weapons-free zone but only upon the  implementation of a 
comprehensive peace accord with all countries in the region including Iran.319  This 
comprehensive peace accord never materialized, and the unacknowledged Israeli nuclear 
arsenal and staunch alliance with the U.S. remain.  
The same can be said for Pakistan, which is also not a signatory to the NPT.320  
Pakistan has a small but growing nuclear arsenal, which the U.S. has largely ignored 
because of Pakistan’s importance in prosecuting the Global War on Terror. In 2010, 
Pakistan was the third largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid raking in a total of $1.8 
billion.321  Additionally, Pakistan also gave rise to the notorious AQ Khan proliferation 
ring that spread nuclear technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea.322  The AQ Khan 
network operated for decades, and it wasn’t until 2004 that Khan confessed his crimes 
and was placed under house arrest.323  Khan’s revelations did nothing to disrupt the U.S. 
alliance with Pakistan, which effectively was granted a free pass after failing to control 
nuclear proliferation to two members of the “axis of evil.” 
As stated in the literature review, the idea of nonproliferation has primacy in U.S. 
policy rhetoric; however, the execution of this policy has been inconsistent and at times 
shortsighted.   The inconsistencies in how the U.S. implements its nonproliferation policy 
complicate its execution; therefore, U.S. nonproliferation strategy must address or at least 
understand these inconsistencies in order to mitigate their effects. 
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3. Don’t Give Them a Reason. States desire WMD for a variety of reasons, but the 
U.S. should be cautious that its policies don’t add to them. South Africa proliferated 
because it felt abandoned and thought that its catalytic strategy would force the West to 
support it should it face the “black tidal wave.”  This does not mean that the U.S. should 
have tolerated apartheid but illustrates how policy can influence proliferation in 
unexpected, paradoxical ways. South Africa was vulnerable to Western sanctions because 
of its alignment. In turn, severing this alignment encouraged South Africa to acquire 
nuclear weapons. 
Iraq is another case where U.S. policy influenced proliferation decisions in 
unexpected directions. Beyond the “blind eye” factors listed above, the U.S. policy of 
encouraging regime change in Iraq served to entrench Saddam Hussein’s bluff. The ILA 
vowed support to the same groups that the dictator wished to deter with the specter of 
WMD. Further, the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) labeled Iraq as one of the 
“chronic military problems” that the U.S. faced, which created the perception that the 
U.S. saw nuclear weapons as a viable option for dealing with Iraq.324  If Saddam 
Hussein’s strategic calculus reasoned that CB weapons were the deterrent that had kept 
the U.S. out of Baghdad, it stood to reason that opacity regarding their final disposition 
would suit his needs. U.S. policy set the conditions for its own failure. 
This contrasts with Libya. It was also called out in the 2001 NPR but was not 
named as part of the “axis of evil.”325  The willingness of the U.S. and the UK to 
negotiate with Gaddafi mitigated whatever mixed signals the 2001 NPR might have sent. 
However, had Bush been more strident in his tones with Libya, this could have created a 
heightened demand for nuclear weapons where there really was none before.   
4. Resources are Black Knights. In all three case studies, the availability of 
resources influenced the effectiveness of sanctions. In the South Africa case, the lack of 
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oil reserves made South Africa vulnerable to embargoes that starved it of oil, but South 
Africa also had deposits of uranium that it could exploit to provide fuel for its nuclear 
programs. South Africa had enough resources to fuel its commercial reactor and build a 
small nuclear arsenal. Unfettered access to uranium was a factor in South Africa’s 
successful proliferation. In the case of Libya and Iraq, neither country had a ready 
domestic access to uranium, which made its programs vulnerable to sanctions.  
However, Iraq and Libya both have extensive oil reserves, which provide a steady 
stream of income and a demand for integration into the global economy. Oil is a black 
knight in and of itself. In both the cases of Libya and Iraq, oil affected the way that 
sanctions were implemented. The sanctions against Libya were constrained because it 
had become a major exporter of oil to Europe, especially after the first phase of U.S. 
unilateral sanctions. The demand for access to Iraqi oil caused the coalition of senders to 
fracture and enabled the oil for food program that Saddam Hussein was able to exploit 
with the “surcharge” placed on Iraqi oil in the later stages of the program.   
5. Congressional Caution. Congress has a role in constructing the legal 
framework for sanctions against target countries. With South Africa, the legislation was 
the Comprehensive Anti-apartheid Act of 1986, which was passed when President 
Reagan’s veto was overridden.326  Libya was sanctioned in the Iran and Libya Sanctions 
Act of 1996, and the Libyan portion of this act was repealed once an accord was struck 
over WMD.327  Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait led to the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990, which 
was finally suspended by President George W. Bush in 2003 shortly after the Iraq 
invasion.328   
In each case, Congress passed a comprehensive set of sanctions against the target 
countries. The laws clearly outlined the reasons why the target was being subjected to 
sanctions, and in each act, the mechanism for lifting sanctions is identified. In each case, 
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the President was granted the prerogative certify that the target has complied with the 
demands of the sanctions and grant their suspension. All three acts prudently balance 
presidential prerogative with congressional responsibility.   
However, with the case of the ILA, Congress abandoned all prudence. Not only 
did the act vow support for Iraqi opposition groups, it called for war crimes tribunals 
against Saddam Hussein and his inner circle.329 Further, the act ignored Iraq’s history of 
political violence and assumed that the fall of Saddam Hussein would lead to a 
democratic transition in Iraq that the U.S. would then support.330  The insurgency and 
sectarian violence that followed the Iraq invasion served as a stark contrast to the wishful 
thinking in the ILA. The fatal flaw in the ILA is that there was no process for reversal, no 
granting of presidential prerogative for its lifting. In this sense, it contradicted the Iraq 
Sanctions Act, which created a mechanism for the lifting of sanctions with two possible 
contingencies—regime change or improved regime behavior. The Iraq Sanctions Act 
made no judgment about which outcome Congress preferred, but merely outlined the 
mechanism for responding to two possibilities. With the ILA, Congress overreached 
making a successful diplomatic outcome unlikely. 
There has never been a pure case of sanctions that were imposed solely to stop 
proliferation, but in final analysis, sanctions can have played a large role in ending these 
proliferation cases and possess the potential to stop future proliferators. Sanctions ended 
apartheid that in turn ended South Africa’s WMD programs. Sanctions did nothing to 
stop Iraq’s initial proliferation efforts, but prevented it from re-arming after Desert Storm. 
Whatever other failures that were generated by U.S. policy towards Iraq, the fact remains 
that sanctions had already prevented Condoleezza Rice’s hypothetical mushroom cloud 
before she had ever uttered the statement. Finally, regardless of whatever instability 
results from its civil war, Libya provides an excellent example of how the “carrot” and 
“stick” approach to sanctions and proliferation can work if both sides are willing to 
negotiate in good faith. With this in mind, the final chapter of this thesis will examine the 
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VI. CONCLUSION: USING IRAN AND THE FUTURE OF 
SANCTIONS AS A NONPROLIFERATION TOOL  
The question that this thesis sought to answer is whether sanctions designed to 
stop the proliferation of WMD were an effective tool of national security strategy. My 
initial hypothesis was: 
“that sanctions, when combined with existing compliance and 
proliferation regimes, are somewhat effective at countering, but not 
ending, WMD programs. States that are determined above all things to 
acquire WMD can and will succeed, but their efforts can be severely 
disrupted and degraded by raising costs and extending timelines.”   
Further, my initial findings were that: 
“sanctions appear somewhat less effective at coercing other behaviors 
beyond proliferation. When linked with other issues such as terrorism, 
human rights, or other internal state behaviors, sanctions become less 
effective. They lose all effectiveness when linked with regime survival.”   
Because there has never been a pure case of sanctions designed solely to stop 
WMD proliferation, the three case studies show mixed results when compared to my 
original hypothesis. However, each case study clearly demonstrates the potential for 
sanctions as a nonproliferation tool. They can be used to build trust, induce policy 
reversals, and if needed, enforce long-term constraint on military potential and the ability 
to procure goods needed to proliferate. Iraq shaded much of my initial hypothesis, but 
even there sanctions were successful at keeping WMD from getting back into Saddam 
Hussein’s hands. However, the assessment of the risk of linking sanctions, proliferation, 
regime survival or other issues such as support to terrorists is confirmed as illustrated 
with Iraq.   
Moving forward, nuclear nonproliferation remains a top priority in U.S. policy, 
and sanction remain a tool to be used towards that end. This examination of sanctions as 
a nonproliferation tool leads to the final assessment of whether they can work with Iran. 
Early in his administration, President Obama’s Prague Speech reaffirmed the U.S. 
commitment to nuclear disarmament and the continuation of the goals spelled out in the 
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NPT.331 President Obama inherited several ongoing proliferation problem, Iran being the 
most prominent and potentially damaging to the stability of the Middle East.   
Iran’s suspected nuclear proliferation is an ongoing crisis in international 
relations. As of this writing, the consensus is that Iran does not have nuclear weapons, but 
seems to be actively pursuing them. Iran has been a member of the NPT since 1970 as a 
non-nuclear-weapons state, and remains for now a member of the IAEA. It has an 
extensive nuclear technology infrastructure332 that includes the ability to mine, mill, 
convert, and enrich uranium.333 Iran’s nuclear efforts began under the U.S. Atom’s for 
Peace program during the 1950s.334  Under the Shah, Iran developed an ambitious long-
term plane to master the nuclear fuel cycle and develop a large network of nuclear power 
reactors.335  The program was canceled by the Ayatollah Khomeini after the revolution 
but resumed in 1984 when Iran began to seek partners to complete construction the 
nuclear power plant started under the Shah.336  Throughout its history, Iran’s nuclear 
program has been a source of regional tension. As illustrated in the Iraq case study, 
longtime regional rival Iraq regarded Iran’s nuclear programs under the Shah as a threat, 
which provided motivation for the beginnings of Iraq’s nuclear programs.337 Most 
recently, the West has been at odds with Iran over its pursuit of uranium enrichment 
programs that will allow Iran to produce HEU, a critical step in a fledgling nuclear 
arsenal. During the last decade, the IAEA has also been at odds with Iran about its 
compliance with IAEA safeguards and standards. In a series of reports on Iran, the IAEA 
spells out the suspicion that Iran has diverted material from its nuclear program to 
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weapons research and has acquired technology, such as explosive bridge wire detonators 
that are only suitable for nuclear weapons.338  
The strategic context of Iran’s suspected nuclear proliferation is a combination of 
regional ambition and the desire to deter the U.S..339  Iran has the largest population in 
the Middle East and is home to the world’s third largest oil reserves and second largest 
natural gas reserves.340  Because of its history, geography, resources Iran sees itself as a 
natural leading power in the region.341  Some factions of the Iranian leadership regard the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons as a critical component of a strong state, especially one 
with regional ambitions like Iran.342  These leaders see nuclear weapons as a key means 
of deterring the U.S., especially in light of the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan.343  Iran 
is also cut off from access to Western arms sales so Iran views nuclear weapons as a way 
to deter its Arab neighbors who are able to purchase the latest U.S. weapons systems. 
From 2002 to 2006, U.S.-aligned Gulf Arab states, with diminutive populations 
compared to Iran, spent more than $150 billion on weapons purchases compared to Iran’s 
$31 billion.344  Some Iranian leaders view nuclear weapons as a way to mitigate its 
limited conventional military capability.345  History plays a role here as many Iranian 
leaders felt that Iraq’s use of chemical weapons was decisive during the Iran-Iraq War. 
Therefore, an unconventional deterrent of Iran’s own would be useful.346  
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Iran’s desire to deter the U.S. can also be viewed in light of other factors. The 
U.S. has sought to constrain Iran with sanctions since the Iranian revolution347, and the 
two nations have had military clashes in the past. Iran can correctly point out that no one 
came to its aid when Iraq attacked with chemical weapons, and that the U.S. all but 
encouraged it.348  Iran was named as part of President Bush’s axis of evil, and the leaked 
2001 Nuclear Posture Review Report identified Iran as possible contingency in which 
nuclear weapons might be used.349  This is in stark contrast to international norms against 
nuclear powers threatening to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear powers. In 2007, 
presidential candidate and Senator John McCain jokingly sang about bombing Iran.350  
Inflammatory policy and rhetoric can be viewed as a driver of Iranian proliferation. 
However, Iran’s nuclear proliferation is in some ways more complex than other 
case studies in this thesis. In addition to being an aspiring regional power, Iran is a 
theocracy, which also serves to influence Iran’s proliferation decisions. In October 2003, 
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei issued a fatwa, or religious finding, that forbade the 
production and use of WMD in any form.351  This type of fatwa is not without precedent. 
During the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq used chemical weapons extensively against Iran. At first, 
Iran did not respond in kind because the Ayatollah Khomeini considered chemical 
weapons prohibited by Islam.352 Khomeini later reversed this decision when Iranian 
cities were under threat of chemical attack. Iran began a chemical weapons program but 
quickly dismantled it upon ratifying the CWC after conclusion of the Iran-Iraq War.353  
Therefore, if Iran feels threatened, security concerns can trump religious ones, but 
proliferation is not a given under Iran’s theocracy.   
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The Obama administration came into office both seeking reverse the damage done 
to the global nuclear nonproliferation regime by the Bush administration and hoping to 
open negotiations with Iran. President Obama’s Prague speech outlined his goal of 
strengthening the NPT and nuclear disarmament. Shortly after his election, the president 
reportedly sent a letter to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei seeking to establish a 
constructive dialogue, and he sent a goodwill message directly to the Iranian people in 
celebration of the Persian New Year in March of 2009.354  This clearly set the tone that 
the Obama administration favored engagement and diplomacy over military conflict with 
Iran. However, hopes of establishing this dialogue quickly evaporated as Iranians took to 
the streets in the summer of 2009 to protest the disputed results of their presidential 
election which returned hardliner President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to power over 
reform candidate Mir Hussein Moussavi. The protests were violently suppressed, and 
under Ahmadinejad, Iran’s nuclear program continued. The U.S. outreach to Iran went 
nowhere, and the IAEA continued to have concerns over Iran’s nuclear activities.355  
Beyond the Iranian protests derailing his outreach to Tehran, President Obama 
inherited a government seemingly at odds with his peaceful goals for Iran, and further 
refinements in policy have seemed more a continuation of the past than a new direction. 
For example, in the 2008 National Defense Strategy left over from the Bush 
administration has a section titled “Win our Nation’s Wars,” which lists Iran as a rogue 
state that might need to be defeated in a military conflict.356  This document was not 
updated until 2011 when the Military Strategy of the United States of America supplanted 
it. The new document still lists Iran as the most dangerous threat in the Middle East 
whose proliferation could set off a regional nuclear arms race.357 The document then 
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details that the U.S. would maintain a military presence in the region to assure its allies 
and prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.358   
However, President Obama backed away from the provocative 2001 NPR and 
extended a “negative security assurance to non-nuclear powers in compliance with the 
NPT in the 2010 NPR extends the negative security assurance to non-nuclear states. But 
it also calls for reversing the nuclear ambitions of countries like North Korea and Iran.359  
Echoing this the 2010 National Security Strategy made holding Iran “accountable” for its 
nuclear activities a top national priority, and that the U.S. would present a “clear choice” 
to Iran in order to prevent it from developing nuclear weapons.360 Despite backing away 
from much of the Bush administrations more inflammatory rhetoric, these documents still 
utilize language that hardly seems like the foundation for a diplomatic effort. Obviously, 
given the tensions that already exist in the region, military conflict with Iran is a clear 
possibility; however, with Iraq as a guide, a conflict that stays militarized has less chance 
for peaceful resolution.   
One policy document, the inaugural 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and 
Development Review, took a different approach. It argued that the U.S. had underutilized 
diplomatic tools to combat proliferation, and that the State Department had used the 
President’s Prague speech as a launch pad for new vigor in nonproliferation 
diplomacy.361  With outreach to Iran dead on arrival and worries about Iran’s 
proliferation growing, the Obama administration and the U.S. turned to sanctions to 
reverse Iran’s nuclear proliferation. 
The U.S. has sanctioned Iran since the 1978 revolution.362  In response to this 
latest concern, Congress passed a series of acts that have tightened trade and financial 
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restrictions with Iran. 363  These acts parallel international efforts such UNSCR 1929 
adopted in June of 2010, which imposed new UN-mandated sanctions on Iran in hopes of 
curbing its nuclear proliferation.364 The European Union, which accounts for a third of 
all Iran’s exports, followed suit and adopted similar trade restrictions.365  In July of 2012, 
the EU, along with some other Asian countries, agreed to embargo Iranian crude oil 
imports.366 
Iran is no stranger to conflict with the West, and following the EU oil embargo, 
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei stated that the various rounds of sanctions 
against Iran since the revolution had “vaccinated” it against this new round, and that Iran 
would come back “100 times stronger” from them.367  However, the tougher sanctions 
had a deep effect, and the Iranian currency soon collapsed.368  As of this writing, the 
Iranian nuclear issue has yet to be resolved, and a military conflict between the U.S. and 
Iran or Israel and Iran may yet materialize over the issue.   
Beyond war, Iran has much to lose from the sanctions. Even if the oil black knight 
causes the coalition of sender to fray, the U.S. can still hurt Iran through banking and 
financial sanctions. Libya is a good illustration of how even a single sender can impede 
economic growth if the target is perceived by international financial institutions as a 
long-term credit risk. Iran still faces a conventional arms race in the Middle East that it is 
already losing and cannot hope to win with a hobbled economy. If Iran’s nuclear 
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proliferation sets off a regional arms race, the U.S. propensity for turning a blind eye to 
the proliferation of its allies should give Tehran pause. Are the Iranians really prepared 
for both a conventional and unconventional arms race with the better-financed Gulf 
Arabs?  As bad as this menu of choices may seem, current policy may actually drive Iran 
in this direction. 
This leads to the driving question of this thesis: can sanctions work in stopping 
Iran’s nuclear proliferation?  The answer is yes, but only if they are combined with 
genuine efforts at diplomacy that moves quickly and includes the extension of a U.S. 
negative security guarantee to Iran. An examination of the factors in the ESR study 
amplify this.   
The senders “slammed the hammer” on Iran with the EU oil embargo, and the 
sanctions have not yet “bitten off more than they can chew” by combining nuclear 
nonproliferation with regime change. However, the broad coalition of senders is unlikely 
to hold together in light of the presence of the oil black knight. The world is unlikely to 
tolerate sanctions causing a rise oil prices that threaten economic recovery. Although a 
drop in oil prices may make things even worse for Iran by mitigating some of the oil as 
black knight effect.  
However, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s rhetoric about U.S. 
sanctions “vaccinating” the Iranian people against echoes the ERS study’s cautions about 
sanctions “creating their own antidotes.”  As in South Africa, the Western arms embargo 
against Iran prompted it to create its own domestic arms industry capable of building 
long-range missiles.369  As with the Libyan case study, the EU oil embargo may push 
Iranian oil further into other markets like China that resist Western calls for embargo. 
This fits with the “resources are black knights” conclusion from the case studies. A 
fractured coalition of senders that allows Iran oil revenue without a solid resolution to the 
nuclear issue could create the same conditions that led to conflict with Iraq.   
Additionally, other conclusive factors identified from the analysis of the case 
studies are present in Iran. While the U.S. has back away from much of its incendiary 
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language against Iran, there still appears to be a hint of dragon slaying in U.S. policy, 
which devotes much of its emphasis to what the U.S. expects from Iran but little to what 
Iran gets in return. As demonstrated with the Libya case, there has to be both a carrot and 
a stick in negotiations. The U.S. position must extend beyond the idea that the only carrot 
on the table is that the U.S. won’t bomb Iranian nuclear facilities or that it might ease 
sanctions. If the primary goal towards Iran is to end its nuclear proliferation, then Iran 
needs good reason to give up on the idea of possessing a nuclear deterrent. U.S. policy 
has few incentives for this. There is no guarantee that if Iran gives up its nuclear 
programs that the U.S. won’t continue to sanction it over other issues such as human 
rights. This lack of incentives, combined with the historical toxicity in U.S.-Iran 
relations, gives Iran reason to proliferate, especially given the conventional inferiority of 
the Iranian military. 
Further, the U.S. has turned a blind eye to other proliferators in the region that has 
fueled Iranian proliferation. One U.S. ally (Israel) and one U.S. friend (Pakistan) operate 
outside of international proliferation norms, and Iraq, nominally an emerging ally, 
attacked Iran with chemical weapons. It is unlikely that the U.S. will be able to reverse 
Israeli and Pakistani proliferation, but it at least can try to address Iran’s security 
concerns. The Iraq and Libya case demonstrate how deeply the Israeli nuclear program 
influences proliferation in the region. If the U.S. were to signal its understanding of this 
issue by renewing the drive for a nuclear-weapons-free Middle East, it could provide a 
trust-building message to the Iranians.   
Finally, U.S. congressional caution has begun to slip regarding Iran, which as the 
Iraq case illustrated, can produce disastrous results. The first instance of congressional 
imprudence is contained in early versions of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human 
Rights Act of 2012, which was drafted by the House of Representatives in 2011. In a 
pattern similar to the ILA, this early version called for expanded contact with Iranian 
resistance groups while at the same time using language that would restrict U.S. 
government officials from meeting with Iranian officials without prior notification to 
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Congress.370  The final version of this bill did not contain this language, but clearly, some 
members of Congress supported this overreach. 
The second instance of congressional recklessness occurred in September of 2012 
when Senators Lindsey Graham introduced Senate Resolution 380, a non-binding 
resolution on Iran’s nuclear programs.371  In language echoing the ILA, the resolution 
seeks to express the sense of the Senate regarding the crisis with Iran. The resolution 
“expresses support for the universal rights and democratic aspirations of the Iranian 
people” and “rejects any United States policy that would rely on efforts to contain a 
nuclear weapons-capable Iran.”372  Finally, it “urges the President to reaffirm the 
unacceptability of an Iran with nuclear-weapons capability and oppose any policy that 
would rely on containment as an option in response to the Iranian nuclear threat.”373 
Thus, the sense of the Senate is that negotiations and sanctions have their limit 
and that goading the President into adopting provocative foreign policy language is a 
congressional prerogative. While sanctions against Iran may fail or reach a limit to their 
usefulness, the Iraq case study provides an interesting counterpoint. Negotiations and 
sanctions reached their limit resulting in Operation Desert Fox that was, in part, directed 
against the suspected remnants of Iraq’s WMD programs. However, even with the 
crippling UN sanctions and military action, the U.S. was never sure that Iraq’s WMD had 
been eliminated until after Baghdad fell. The same can be said for Iran. If the U.S. attacks 
Iran’s nuclear programs, how can it ever be sure that everything has been eliminated? In 
this light, continued sanction would amount to a containment strategy. In effect, by 
rejecting containment, the logical conclusion to Senator Graham’s resolution is a ground 
war in Iran. Given, the U.S. experience in Iraq, the actions that may result from 
resolutions like this ought to give policy-makers pause. 
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This is where Clausewitz again comes into play. Like regular warfare, economic 
war is an extension of policy by other means, and the U.S. and its allies have embarked in 
an economic war with Iran over nuclear proliferation. What is not clear from this policy 
is the path that leads to achieving the goal of ending Iran’s nuclear proliferation. The case 
studies of South Africa and Libya demonstrate that when senders of sanctions are clear in 
their intention and the desired outcome of their policies—and the target’s security is not 
threatened—political resolution is possible. Iraq demonstrates that when the senders of 
sanctions are at odds over policy goals a dangerous political impasse will likely result. 
The history of Iran’s chemical weapons program demonstrates that nuclear proliferation 
is not a given, and that at least some Iranian leaders think Iran should proliferate only 
when threatened. This means that there is room for negotiation. 
The key factor in all the cases is trust. South Africa and Libya could trust that the 
senders of the sanctions did not want to destroy their targets. With Iraq, the opposite 
became true as the U.S. chose to legislate and then effect regime change even when its 
nonproliferation goals had been reached. As with Iraq, the same toxic atmosphere of 
mistrust clouds the strategic goals of the U.S. and its allies towards Iran. Creating a 
policy towards Iran that provides more incentives to end its nuclear program than to keep 
it is critical for even the potential for success to exist. The U.S. had made clear what Iran 
stands to lose with its nuclear programs, but it has never been clear on what it can gain 
and how to get there. South Africa and Libya’s compliance with nonproliferation norms 
provide a good example of how trust can be built. 
Clausewitz understood that all war is the realm of chance, and economic warfare 
contains the same uncertainties. However, the driving force behind using sanctions is the 
idea that they are a better tool than war for managing conflicts between states.   In order 
for them to prevent war, they have to given a chance to success, and like war, a lasting 
framework for economic peace between both sides on the conflict must be enacted in 
order for sanctions to work. Thus, sanctions are a useful tool but only if they serve clear 
goals that reduce the chance of conflict, not escalate it. This is the enduring lesson of the 
potential for sanctions as a nonproliferation tool. 
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